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THE CONSTITUTION AND CAPITAL SENTENCING:
PURSUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY
SCOTT W. HOWE*
Equal Justice and The Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis.
By David C. Baldus, George Woodworth and Charles A. Pulaski, Jr.
Boston: Northeastern University Press. 1990. Pp. vii, 698. $65.00.
Modern legal discussion about capital punishment has centered on
questions of equality. Are we distributing the death penalty even-
handedly, or capriciously and discriminatorily? This focus stems from
the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia 1, in which five Jus-
tices voted to invalidate standardless capital sentencing, effectively abol-
ishing capital punishment as it then existed. Although relying on the
eighth rather than the fourteenth amendment, all five Justices criticized
the standardless systems because they encouraged arbitrary or discrimi-
natory action.2 Only four years later, the Court authorized the resump-
tion of capital sentencing under new "guided discretion" schemes.3
Legal debate continued, however, as to whether those systems satisfied
Furman's perceived promise of "reasonable consistency" in the distribu-
tion of death sentences.'
* Assistant Professor, Western New England College, School of Law; A.B. Mis-
souri, 1977; J.D. Michigan, 1981. I would like to thank my colleagues, Anne Goldstein,
Arthur Leavens, and Barry Stern for their encouragement and comments on earlier drafts
of this essay; Dean Howard I. Kalodner for providing assistance through a research
grant; and Barbara Falvo for technical and secretarial support.
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). A claim of racial discrimination in the use of the death
penalty was first raised and rejected in Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968),
vacated on other grounds, 398 U.S. 262 (1970). The Supreme Court also rejected a claim
of unconstitutional arbitrariness in the use of the death penalty brought under the four-
teenth amendment a year before Furman. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 196
(1971).
2. 408 U.S. at 251-57 (Douglas, J.); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J.); id. at 312-14 (White,
J.). Justices Brennan and Marshall also pointed out the arbitrary effects of the then-
current statutes. See id. at 293-95 (Brennan, J.); id. at 364-66 (Marshall, J.). Their opin-
ions, however, revealed that they would have struck down the death penalty whether it
were administered equitably or not.
3. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,
251-53 (1976). The Court also approved the new Texas statute in Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262, 276 (1976).
4. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 223 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
5. The legal literature on this question is voluminous. For a representative sample,
see Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Stat-
utes, 26 Crime & Delinq., 563 (1980); Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons:
Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1143 (1980); Zeisel, Race Bias in the
Administration of the Death Penalty: The Florida Experience, 95 Harv. L Rev. 456
(1981), Bowers, The Pervasiveness of Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-
Furman Capital Statutes 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology, 1067 (1983); Bentele, The Death
Penalty in Georgia: Still Arbitrary, 62 Wash. U.L.Q. 573 (1985); Hubbard, "Reasonable
Levels of Arbitrariness" in Death Sentencing Patterns: A Tragic Perspective on Capital
Punishment, 18 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1113 (1985); Geimer, Death At Any Cost: A Critique
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Equal Justice and the Death Penalty describes the most comprehensive
of the empirical inquiries conducted to measure the consistency of a
modem death penalty system. Beginning in the late 1970s, the authors,
led by Professor David Baldus of the University of Iowa Law School,
undertook several studies of Georgia's post-Furman capital sentencing
scheme. Their conclusions probably thrilled few people on either side of
the death penalty debate.6 They found more equality in decisionmaking
than under the pre-Furman system. Nevertheless, they still identified a
highly uneven distribution of death sentences among similar capital
cases, suggesting the continuing influence of illegitimate factors. Specifi-
cally, the researchers sought to measure the extent to which racial vari-
ables influenced death penalty decisions. Although they found little
evidence of systematic discrimination against black offenders as a whole,
they identified a powerful tendency toward death sentences in white vic-
tim cases, especially those involving black defendants.7
The basic story presented in this book will strike those familiar with
capital sentencing law as old news. Several years ago, the authors' study
became the subject of a much-publicized8 Supreme Court decision. In
the early 1980s, lawyers for several inmates on Georgia's death-row had
begun using the Baldus study to challenge their clients' sentences under
the eighth and fourteenth amendments.' One of those inmates was War-
ren McCleskey, an African-American who had killed a white policeman.
In his case, styled McCleskey v. Kemp"0 in the Supreme Court, a five-
Justice majority denied that the very empirical evidence around which
the book unfolds established any constitutional violation. Even assuming
the validity of the researchers' conclusions, the Court said that no consti-
of the Supreme Court's Recent Retreat From Its Death Penalty Standards, 12 Fla. St. L.
Rev. 737 (1985); Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital Punishment, 99
Harv. L. Rev. 1670 (1986); Geimer & Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Opera-
tive Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 Am. J. Crim. L. 1 (1988); W. White,
The Death Penalty in the Nineties 135 (1991).
6. They published their early conclusions in article form. See Baldus, Pulaski &
Woodworth, Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty:
A Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 Stetson L. Rev. 133 (1986); Baldus, Woodworth
& Pulaski, Monitoring and Evaluating Temporary Death Sentencing Systems: Lessons
From Georgia, 18 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1375 (1985); Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Com-
parative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 661 (1983).
7. See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
8. See Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme
Court, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388, 1388-89 (1988). The decision continues to receive public-
ity. See, e.g., Georgia Inmate is Executed After 'Chaotic' Legal Move, N.Y. Times, Sept.
26, 1991, at A18, col. 1; Inmate Whose Appeals Shook System Faces Execution, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 24, 1991, at A20, col. 1; In Land of Death Penalty, Accusations of Racial
Bias, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1991, at Al.
9. See generally S. Gross & R. Mauro, Death and Discrimination 134-35 (1989)(not-
ing that three Georgia death-row inmates first raised claims based on evidence from the
Baldus studies in 1982).
10. 481 U.S. 279 (1987), aff'g McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (1 1th Cir. 1985),
aff'g McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338 (N.D.Ga. 1984).
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tutional basis existed for rejecting the Georgia death-penalty scheme."
Despite the decision in McCleskey, this book remains an important
contribution to the literature on the death penalty. Most importantly, it
aids judgment about the accuracy and meaning of the researchers' con-
clusions. Doubts existed after McCleskey. The Supreme Court pur-
ported to accept the results of the investigations, but suggested that the
results did not reveal a risk of racially motivated decisionmaking.12
Moreover, the lower courts had criticized the studies. The federal dis-
trict court disparaged the researchers' methodologies, and the Eleventh
Circuit doubted their conclusions.' 3 The book makes independent judg-
ment about the validity of the findings possible by explaining the proce-
dures and results of the investigations and by responding directly to the
judicial criticisms.
Information about the reliability and the implications of the studies
serves important functions, even after McCleskey. First, it enhances un-
derstanding within the legal community of the meaning and propriety of
the McCleskey decision. Did the studies, indeed, reveal a risk of racially
based decisionmaking? Was the methodology simply too complex for the
Court to comprehend? How did these statistical studies differ from
others that the Court had previously accepted as establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination violative of the Constitution?' The informa-
tion is also valuable apart from its usefulness in judging the McCleskey
decision. If accepted, the research conclusions carry implications for leg-
islatures"5 seeking to minimize inequities in the distribution of death
sentences. The study suggests that those bodies should restrict the use of
capital punishment to categories of extraordinarily aggravated murder
for which death sentences regularly will be imposed."6
The authors have made their studies understandable to lawyers and
law makers who know little about statistics or sociological research.
This was not easy, because their methodologies were complex and "so-
11. See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
13. For discussion of the district court's criticisms, see infra note 106. The Court of
Appeals rejected the researchers' conclusions that race played a causal role in death-
penalty decisions because "[g]eneralized studies would appear to have little hope of ex-
cluding every possible factor that might make a difference between crimes and defend-
ants, exclusive of race." McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 894.
14. The book also summarizes studies conducted by others and conducted in other
states to measure the presence of racially based decisionmaking in death penalty selection
systems. This information tended to confirm the conclusions the authors reached in their
Georgia studies and was, thus, relevant to their presentation. A more limited summary
of these studies also was included in S. Gross & R. Mauro, supra note 9, at 17-105.
15. The authors note that Congress has the authority to enact legislation to promote
equality in state capital sentencing systems. See D. Baldus, G. Woodward & C. Pulaski,
Equal Justice and the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis 417 (1990) [here-
inafter "Equal Justice"]. This authority comes from section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment, which gives Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions" of the fourteenth amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.
16. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
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phisticated."' 7 With few exceptions, however, the authors detail the as-
sumptions, procedures, and vulnerabilities of the studies in simple
terms. 8 They wisely relegate discussions of unduly technical matters to
the endnotes. They also present the results of the studies in comprehen-
sible tables and graphs and explain their implications. Consequently,
even the non-statistician can make educated judgments about the validity
of their conclusions.
The authors also seek to describe the importance of their evidence
from the perspective of constitutional analysis, but this is not the book's
strength. They include a short discussion of the fourteenth amendment
argument for demanding statistical consistency in capital sentencing.
Though the argument is more problematic than the authors suggest, at
least it is appropriately grounded in the fourteenth amendment.' 9 Never-
theless, the central theme of the book builds on the view that the eighth
amendment is the proper source of equality objectives. The authors im-
ply that a concern for equality is the only explanation for Furman and its
eighth amendment progeny. Yet this view is troublesome on both de-
scriptive and normative levels. As a description of the promise embodied
in the Court's early capital sentencing decisions, it is overstated. There
was always much more doubt than the authors suggest that a majority of
the Court had settled on equality as the overriding aim of eighth amend-
ment regulation. From a normative perspective, the authors also fail to
explain why the Court should interpret the eighth amendment in this
fashion. Indeed, by assuming that the function of the protection against
cruel and unusual punishment is to promote consistency, the authors ob-
scure the true eighth amendment goal of regulating capital sentencing,
which is distinguishable from any fourteenth amendment objective.
This review aims to describe the difficulties with the authors' view of
how the Constitution regulates capital sentencing and to outline an alter-
native perspective. Part I summarizes the authors' empirical evidence
and their view of its constitutional significance. Part II develops two
general criticisms of the authors' legal analysis. First, they fail to address
the major problems with the contention that the Constitution demands
statistical consistency in the distribution of death sentences. I contend
that pursuing statistical consistency as the overriding objective of consti-
tutional regulation would carry high costs, especially from the abolition-
ist's perspective. Second, the authors contend that equality is the
overriding regulatory objective of both the eighth and the fourteenth
amendments. I demonstrate that while the fourteenth amendment aims
in some fashion to promote equality in the distribution of death sentences
among the deserving, the eighth amendment's regulatory goal is entirely
different: to ensure in the first instance that death sentences are imposed
only on those who deserve them. Finally, part III explores whether the
17. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987).
18. For an exception, see infra note 213 and accompanying text.
19. See Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 370-75.
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Georgia death sentencing system fulfills this view of what the eighth
amendment requires. I explain why, even without empirical evidence, we
can conclude that the Georgia system, like virtually every other existing
capital selection scheme, fails this eighth amendment objective.
I. THE AUTHORS' LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
If one assumes, as do the authors of Equal Justice and the Death Pen-
alty, that death constitutes the "just deserts" of any capital offender,2"
then the decision to strike down standardless capital sentencing schemes
in Furman v. Georgia can only rest on concerns about consistency.2"
This assumption forecloses a possible condemnation of capital-punish-
ment schemes under the eighth amendment based on their failure to pro-
duce judgments about whether the offender "deserves" the death penalty.
The authors would concede that the eighth amendment proscribes the
imposition of the death penalty on one who does not deserve it. How-
ever, the capital offender deserves the death penalty, according to their
assumption, simply because he committed the capital crime.' Conse-
20. To be sure, defendants convicted of murder beyond a reasonable doubt may
not seem particularly deserving of similar protections, even if they receive death
sentences that are attributable to their race or to the race of their victims Cer-
tainly, the imposition of death sentences in such cases may not offend notions of
disproportionality or 'iust deserts, " since presumably any defendant whose only
complaint is that his death sentence was racially discriminatory or otherwise com-
paratively excessive was convicted after a fair trial of a serious murder for which
the legislature has authorized a death sentence.
Id. at 417 (emphasis added). See also id. at 14 ("The problem [of arbitrariness] is not that
the defendant's crime and past record necessarily make a death sentence unthinkable and
thereby excessive in the traditional sense that the concept has been employed by the
Supreme Court. Rather the problem is that imposing a death sentence in such a case is
disproportionately severe in comparison to the high frequency with which life sentences
are imposed in 'similar' cases.") (footnote omitted).
21. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Justice White in Furman appeared to make a slightly differ-
ent argument premised on the relative infrequency of death sentences compared to the
number of crimes for which death was a possible sanction. The argument focused on the
failure of capital punishment under those circumstances to serve valid penological func-
tions. In the end, however, the lack of reasonable consistency in the distribution of capi-
tal sentences among capital offenders appeared crucial to his argument. If the few death
sentences were distributed with reasonable consistency among "an identifiable subclass of
all capital defendants," the death penalty could be thought to have served penological
ends regarding the members of the subclass. Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of
the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1690, 1693 n.15 (1974). Justice White's
opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 222 (1976)(White, J., concurring) also sup-
ports the view that it was the failure to impose the death penalty with "reasonable consis-
tency" on capital offenders that underlay his objections to the systems at issue in Furman.
22. The authors can be understood to assume that the crime is one for which the
Supreme Court has not categorically proscribed death as a possible punishment. In
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), the Court held that the death penalty was cate-
gorically inapplicable to the crime of rape and implied that it could not constitutionally
be applied to crimes that did not result in "the taking of [human] life." 433 U.S. at 599.
Later, the Court exempted some offenders on the margins of the murder category. In
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), it held that capital punishment is inapplicable
to a person who aids and abets a felony during which a co-felon kills, but who does not
himself intend to kill, attempt to kill, or actually kill. See 458 U.S. at 801. In Tison v.
1992]
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quently, the objection to the standardless system must rest elsewhere,
and the best argument derives from notions of equality:23 the potential
created by such systems "that those chosen for execution will be indistin-
guishable from the rest on any legally appropriate basis-or, worse, that
they will be distinguishable only by legally improper criteria-poverty,
powerlessness, or race." 2
4
Although their assumption forecloses the best alternative explanation
for the result in Furman,25 the authors contend, reasonably, that the
opinions supporting the decision reveal that it rested on equality con-
cerns. While Justices Brennan and Marshall voted to strike down the
death penalty altogether, three other Justices-Douglas, Stewart, and
White-rested their conclusions purely on procedural grounds. It was
perplexing that these three Justices relied on the eighth rather than the
fourteenth amendment; the latter appeared the proper grounding for ob-
jections based on inequality.26 Further, the Court had only recently re-
jected allegations of undue arbitrariness brought in a fourteenth
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), the Court narrowed the exemption by holding that felony
murderers who otherwise meet the Enmund standard are subject to the death penalty if
they were involved in a major way in the felony and if they displayed reckless indifference
to human life. See 458 U.S. at 158.
23. A substantial disparity in the number of executions versus death sentences on a
national level had existed for decades before Furman. In 1938, for example, only 190
persons were executed, a small figure compared to that year's 9,000 capital homicides.
Nonetheless, 1938 represents the largest number of executions in America since the gov-
ernment began keeping statistics. Between 1960 and 1964, the nation again averaged
about 9,000 capital homicides per year. See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America 47
(1982). But during that same period, an annual average of only 60 persons were exe-
cuted. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, National Prisoner Statistics Report: Capital Punishment
1979, 17 (1980) [hereinafter "Capital Punishment 1979"]. As difficult as it was to ex-
plain, the disparity became even more pronounced in the late 1960s. Even a comparison
of serious homicide convictions with death sentences pronounced revealed a major dispro-
portion. In 1970, for example, the F.B.I. reported that 1,631 persons were convicted of
murder and non-negligent homicide. See Federal Bureau of Investigations, Crime in the
United States-1970, 114 (1971) (conviction figures for murder and non-negligent homi-
cide). That same year, however, judges and juries pronounced a capital sanction less than
100 times. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Capital Punishment
(1980-1986).
24. S. Gross & R. Mauro, supra note 9, at 4.
25. See generally Howe, Resolving the Conflict in the Capital Sentencing Cases; A De-
sert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 Ga. L. Rev. - (1992)(forthcoming).
26. See, e.g., Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment, 1972 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 25:
The arguments of Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White... prefer to emphasize
the use of the eighth amendment as a tool for testing whether the penalty of
death is evenhandedly applied. Why they should have done this is obscure in
view of the fact that existing doctrines of equal protection (which was the em-
phasis of the Douglas opinion) or due process of law should have furnished
more than adequate ground for striking down the death penalty, once the fac-
tual premises which these three Justices proffer (relating to the arbitrariness or
irrationality of the penalty's use, or in Douglas's case, to its use on despised or
dispossessed minorities) are accepted. To view the eighth amendment in those
terms deprives it of a dimension which is latent in almost all of the previous
cases, particularly in the Weems case and in the Warren opinion in Trop-as an
independently potent moral force which is at the disposal of the least dangerous
1992] CAPITAL SENTENCING
amendment due process challenge to standardless capital schemes in Mc-
Gautha v. California.27 Nonetheless, each of the five majority Justices
condemned the sentences in Furman in part on grounds that standardless
sentencing systems produced discriminatory or arbitrary results. 8
Moreover, none of the Justices suggested that the vice of standardless
systems was their failure to resolve the "just deserts" of the capital of-
fender. Consequently, Furman was, and still is, perceived as requiring
reasonable consistency in capital sentencing,29 though, of course, that
conclusion does not greatly clarify its meaning.30
Although Furman abolished capital punishment as it then existed, a
majority of states, including Georgia, promptly enacted new death pen-
alty statutes.3' Georgia's new system, which became a paradigm for
other states, 2 contained two new features.33 First, it required the jury at
the sentencing hearing to find the presence of at least one of ten "aggra-
vating circumstances" as a prerequisite to imposing a death sentence.'
branch of government and which may be used to make the most dangerous
branch a little less so.
But see J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 173-74 (1980) (arguing that the word "unusual"
in the relevant eighth amendment clause incorporates a concern for equal enforcement).
Cf. Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 Harv. L
Rev. 1773 (1970) (arguing that at least where death is widely authorized but rarely im-
posed, it becomes cruel and unusual).
27. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
28. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
29. The four dissenters in Furman viewed the common objection of the five majority
justices as one building on inequality concerns: "The decisive grievance of the opinions
... is that the present system of discretionary sentencing in capital cases has failed to
produce even handed justice; ... that the selection process has followed no rational pat-
tern." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 398-99 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). For evidence
that this view of Furman still prevails, see, e.g., W. White, supra note 5, at 135 ("Furman
invalidated a system of capital punishment that produced arbitrary results.").
30. The three justices in Furman who outlawed standardless capital sentencing on
procedural grounds reserved judgment on whether the death penalty might be unconsti-
tutional in all circumstances. Consequently, they failed to specify whether standards
were required at all phases of the selection process in capital cases or only at the sentenc-
ing trial. Further, they failed to clarify what kind of standards would be appropriate
where standards were required, rendering the meaning of Furman uncertain. See Note, A
Reasoned Moral Response: Rethinking Texas' Capital Sentencing Statute After Penry Y.
Lynaugh, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 407, 421 (1990).
31. Pursuant to Georgia's new statutory scheme, a person convicted of murder could
either receive a sentence of death or of life imprisonment. See Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1101
(1972). The sentence would be life imprisonment unless the jury at a separate evidentiary
hearing following the guilty verdict concluded that certain standards were met and, ulti-
mately, that death was the appropriate punishment. See id. § 26-3102 (Supp. 1975).
32. See Bentele, supra note 5, at 573.
33. Although the pre-Furman system of capital sentencing in Georgia required a sep-
arate sentencing hearing after the principal trial, the majority of states had not allowed
for a separate sentencing inquiry. In McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), the
Court upheld this unitary trial system along with the failure to provide sentencing stan-
dards. See id. at 207-13. After Furman, however, states that had not sought to create
mandatory death-penalty systems uniformly adopted the system of bifurcated trials.
34. The statutory aggravating factors were as follows:
(I) The offense... was committed by a person with a prior record of convic-
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Second, it required the Georgia Supreme Court to compare each death
sentence issued to the sentences issued in "similar cases" to ensure that it
was not comparatively "disproportional." The Court upheld this new
scheme in 1976, in Gregg v. Georgia,35 with only Justices Brennan and
Marshall dissenting.
For the authors of the Baldus study, the opinions supporting the Gregg
decision indicate that consistency36 is the central eighth amendment ob-
jective for regulating capital sentencing. 37 That view is reasonable when
tion for a capital felony, or the offense of murder was committed by a
person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal
convictions;
(2) The offense ...was committed while the offender was engaged in the
commission of [specified felonies] or aggravated battery or the offense of
murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission
of burglary or arson in the first degree;
(3) The offender, by his act of murder... knowingly created a great risk of
death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or
device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one
person;
(4) The offender committed the offense ... for himself or another, for the
purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value;
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or
solicitor, or former district attorney or solicitor was committed during or
because of the exercise of his official duty;
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed
murder as an agent or employee of another person;
(7) The offense.., was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman
in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to
the victim;
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, correc-
tions employee, or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official
duties;
(9) The offense ... was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from,
the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement; or
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with,
or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement,
of himself or another."
See Ga. Code Ann. § 27-534.1(b)(Supp. 1975).
The present Georgia capital sentencing system employs essentially the same list of ten
aggravating factors. However, in the original post-Furman statute, the death penalty
applied to some crimes other than murder. See § 17-10-30(b)(1982). After the Supreme
Court's decision in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), see supra notes 184-90, the
Georgia death penalty statute was revised to apply only to murder. Furthermore, the
first aggravating factor was later reworded to apply "where the offense.., was commit-
ted by a person with a prior record of conviction for [specified felonies]." Ga. Code Ann.
§ 17-10-30(b)(1).
35. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
36. See Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 26-27 ("If, in fact, [our] study concluded that
the Georgia statute had failed to produce rational, consistent sentencing results, such a
finding would threaten the central premise of the Court's conclusion in Gregg that the
Georgia statute was constitutional.")
37. The authors contend that the Gregg opinions demanded consistency among those
charged with capital murder. See id. at 28 (declaring that "Furman condemned the cu-
mulative results of the entire death-sentencing process"). This view, however, does not
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the opinions are read in isolation.3" Gregg had argued that the reforms
in the Georgia system would not prevent the same seemingly random
pattern of death sentences that the pre-Furman system had produced.39
He noted that the new sentencing scheme would "necessarily operate in a
criminal justice system that was 'honeycombed with discretion.' "40 The
prosecutor retained unregulated discretion in charging and plea-offer de-
terminations and the choice whether or not to pursue the death penalty
after conviction. 4 The executive branch also retained unregulated au-
thority to grant requests for clemency.42 The power to reprieve offenders
from death eligibility at these stages meant that the sentencing reforms
could not ensure consistency in the selection process. Further, the sen-
tencing standards themselves only minimally confined sentencer choice.
Even when the presence of one of the statutory aggravating factors had
been identified-and at least one of them would apply to almost every
murder case-the sentencer could still choose to withhold the death pen-
alty without stating why. Despite the persuasiveness of these arguments,
a majority of the Justices dismissed them, though in separate opinions.
Justice White, writing for himself and two others,43 asserted that prose-
cutors would virtually always pursue the death penalty as long as they
had the evidence to establish the crime and one of the aggravating fac-
tors.' He also stated that jurors would regularly impose the death pen-
alty where one of the factors was established. 4  Further, he suggested
that the comparative review carried out by the Georgia Supreme Court
would protect against any death sentences "imposed for discriminatory
reasons or wantonly or freakishly." '' Justice Stewart, joined by Justices
Powell and Stevens, disagreed that the discretion exercised before convic-
tion or after sentencing raised any constitutional concern." However, as
square with Justice Stewart's opinion in Gregg. See supra note 47 and accompanying
text.
38. This interpretation is doubtful, however, when the opinions are read in conjunc-
tion with other opinions rendered that very same day. See infra notes 151-56 and accom-
panying text.
39. See 428 U.S. at 199 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
40. W. White, supra note 5, at 53.
41. There was some doubt about the prosecutor's authority under the statute to de-
cline to pursue the death penalty after conviction, but it soon became clear that this
authority existed. See Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 29, 225 n.7 1.
42. See generally id. at 53-54. See also Bentele, supra note 5, at 621-38 (discussing
discretion exercised in clemency decision in Georgia).
43. The two others were Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. See Gregg, 428
U.S. at 207. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate opinion simply concurring in the judg-
ment. See id. at 227. Justice Stewart also wrote an opinion supporting the judgment that
was joined by Justices Powell and Stevens. See id. at 158.
44. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 225 (White, J., concurring).
45. See id. at 222 ("it [is] reasonable to expect that juries-even given discretion not
to impose the death penalty-will impose the death penalty in a substantial portion of the
cases so defined").
46. Id. at 224.
47. See id. at 199 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion). Stewart opined that:
The existence of these discretionary stages is not determinative of the issues
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for Gregg's arguments that the new scheme would continue to foster ar-
bitrariness at the sentencing proceeding, Justice Stewart responded in
even more fervent terms than Justice White. He agreed with the Georgia
Supreme Court that the new scheme actually "guid[ed]" 48 and "con-
trolled [sentencer discretion by providing] clear and objective lan-
guage,"4 9 and that it would, therefore, produce a "non-discriminatory"
pattern of death sentences among those convicted of capital crimes. 0
Having thus read both Furman and Gregg as promises to ensure rea-
sonable consistency51 in the capital selection process,52 the authors of the
Baldus study set out to test the post-Furman Georgia system to see
whether that goal had been accomplished." Their original investigation,
dubbed the Procedural Reform Study ("PRS"), sought to test for arbi-
trariness and racial discrimination at only two stages of the capital selec-
before us. At each of these stages an actor in the criminal justice system makes
a decision which may remove a defendant from consideration as a candidate for
the death penalty. Furman, in contrast, dealt with the decision to impose the
death sentence on a specific individual who had been convicted of a capital
offense.
Id. at 200.
48. Id. at 197.
49. Id. at 197-98 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829,
834, 204 S.E. 2d 612, 615 (1974)).
50. Id. Justice Stewart also emphasized that the system of comparative review to be
conducted by the Georgia Supreme Court should protect against the infliction of the
death penalty "on a capriciously selected group of convicted defendants." Id. at 204.
51. See Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 26-27.
52. See id. at 28. The authors fail to explain how a call for consistency in the overall
process can be derived from Justice Stewart's opinion in Gregg. That opinion implied
that only discretion at the sentencing phase is of any constitutional import. Of course,
assuming the correctness of Gregg's argument, the purpose of limiting sentencing discre-
tion should be questioned since this practice would not tend to produce a distribution of
death sentences among capital offenders in any rational or consistent pattern. Thus, Jus-
tice Stewart's view was not sensible unless he was making the same assumptions, them-
selves quite questionable, made by Justice White.
53. The researchers defined two "impossibility" hypotheses, which posed similar
questions. See Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 2. The first came from Justice Harlan's
opinion for the Court in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), rejecting a due
process challenge to standardless capital sentencing and to the unitary trial system then
in vogue. Justice Harlan had declared that the formulation of rules or standards that
could rationally distinguish between those who should die and those who should live was
"beyond present human ability," id. at 204, so that arbitrariness and discrimination in
capital sentencing was inevitable. See Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 2. See generally C.
Black, Capital Punishment: The Inevitability of Caprice and Mistake (1981).
Justice Rehnquist articulated the second "impossibility" hypothesis in his dissent in
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 316-21 (1976). He doubted that a state appel-
late court could effectively identify "similar" cases for purposes of conducting the com-
parative proportionality review promised by the new Georgia scheme:
All that such review of death sentences can provide is a comparison of fact
situations which must in their nature be highly particularized if not unique, and
the only relief which it can afford is to single out the occasional death sentence
which in the view of the reviewing court does not conform to the standards
established by the legislature.
Id. at 316; see also Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 2.
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tion process: the prosecutor's decision whether to pursue the death
penalty after conviction and the jury's decision whether to impose that
sanction at the sentencing trial. The authors also sought to determine
whether the comparative proportionality review conducted by the Geor-
gia Supreme Court remedied any of the problems identified at those
stages. Ultimately, they sought to compare the results of the pre- and
post-Furman systems to determine whether the reforms had reduced the
level of arbitrariness and discrimination at these post-conviction stages.
The authors' method for defining and detecting arbitrariness and dis-
crimination appears simple. After identifying a large group of cases in-
volving capital convictions under both the pre- and post-Furman
systems,54 the researchers amassed data regarding the details of each
crime and offender. 51 With this data, they could attempt to identify cate-
gories of "similar" cases on a scale graduated from those in which the
death penalty was "least appropriate" to those in which it was "most
appropriate." To measure "arbitrariness," they could then examine the
death selection rate in each category to determine the consistency with
which these similar cases were treated. The authors classified as pre-
sumptively "excessive" those death sentences that occurred in a category
of "similar cases" at a rate of less than 35 percent; they classified as pre-
sumptively "evenhanded" death sentences in any category in which the
death sentencing rate was more than 80 percent.56 They could also de-
termine whether the figures conformed with the expectation of progres-
sively greater rates of death selection at the end of the spectrum in which
the death penalty was "most appropriate., 57 Likewise, within each cate-
54. See Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 43. The data sets for the two groups were
constructed differently. The post-Furman set included the first 594 offenders who were
convicted of murder under the new statute through June, 1978. These cases were not a
sample but rather the entire universe of Georgia defendants convicted of murder during
the specified time period. The pre-Furman data set includes two groups of cases. The
first group covered the last 131 defendants convicted of murder before Furman, working
backward to September 1969. Because of the small number of death sentences occurring
within this group, the researchers added 25 cases involving death sentences between 1966
and 1969 that were reported in the official opinions of the Georgia Supreme Court. See
id.
55. Id. at 44. In the PRS, the researchers collected data regarding approximately 150
aggravating and mitigating factors. This information was obtained from the official
records of the Georgia Supreme Court, the Georgia Department of Offender Rehabilita-
tion, the Georgia Department of Pardons and Paroles, and Georgia's Bureau of Vital
Statistics. See id. The authors include the instrument used to log this data in Appendix
C of the book. See id. at 479-93. As is apparent from their method for gathering infor-
mation, the evaluation of each case was not limited to what decision makers within the
selection process knew at the time of their decision.
56. See id. at 84.
57. The authors also measured "arbitrariness" in other ways. For example, they mea-
sured and compared the median scores of the life sentence and death sentence cases using
scales they designed for measuring the appropriateness of the death penalty, see infra
notes 60-68 and accompanying text, and compared the differences. See generally Equal
Justice, supra note 15, at 80-139 (discussing the authors study of arbitrariness and exces-
siveness in Georgia's capital sentencing system before and after Furman).
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gory, the researchers could measure any disparities in the death selection
rates depending upon the presence or absence of illegitimate factors such
as race. Since each subgroup represented "similar" cases in terms of the
propriety of the death penalty, any disparities were, by definition, attrib-
utable to illegitimate factors.
58
While seemingly simple, this effort involved overcoming fundamental
obstacles. The authors describe it as the "similar case problem," 59 but it
really embodies two separate issues. First, the authors had to resolve
what measure should be used to judge capital murder cases. They could
not establish that prosecutors or juries were departing from a normative
standard of decisionmaking without knowing what standard those deci-
sionmakers were supposed to be applying. This issue might aptly be
called the "normative standard" determination. The authors also had to
resolve how to define subgroups of similar cases along the continuum
defined by this standard from "least appropriate" to "most appropriate"
for the death penalty. This question represents the "similar case" deter-
mination. The difficulty was that the Supreme Court had never defined a
normative standard for judging capital cases or a method for grouping
cases as "similar" along the continuum. The researchers addressed these
obstacles by first concluding, essentially on their own, that the correct
normative standard for distinguishing capital cases was the "moral cul-
pability" or "blameworthiness" of the capital offender.' That conclu-
58. The researchers also used other techniques to measure racial discrimination, see
id. at 140-43, but describe this method as "particularly telling." Id. at 143.
59. Id. at 46.
60. See id. at 47. The authors contend that this factor should be the "principal con-
cern". See id. at 68 n.17 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 311-13 (1972)(White,
J., concurring), 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring), 387-89 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), God-
frey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980)). But, to say that "culpability" should be the
"principal concern" is not the same thing as saying that it is the only concern. Moreover,
even in support of this watered-down proposition, the citations provided turn out to be
fairly ethereal.
Clearer, though still insufficient, support for the authors' proposition is found later in
Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Furman in which he implied that culpability
was the normative standard to be applied by the capital sentencer: "[Tlhe 19th century
movement away from mandatory death sentences... recognized that individual culpabil-
ity is not always measured by the category of the crime committed." Furman, 408 U.S.
at 402 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 601 (1978)(plu-
rality opinion of Burger, C.J.) (sentencing process must permit consideration of the
"character and record of the individual offender").
In recent decisions, the Court has declared repeatedly and with great clarity that "cul-
pability" or "blameworthiness" is the appropriate measure for distinguishing capital
cases. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2947 (1989)("punishment should be
directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant"); South Carolina v.
Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 2210 (1989) ("our cases have consistently recognized that '[fnor
purposes of imposing the death penalty... [the defendant's] punishment must be tailored
to his personal responsibility an moral guilt."). Cf Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502
(1987)("personal responsibility and moral guilt" for the murder). See also California v.
Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)(O'Connor, J., concurring)(a "moral response" to de-
fendant's background, character and crime should determine the appropriate sentence);
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 12 (1982)(Powell, J., concurring)(conduct which
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sion was important. It assumed that prosecutors and juries should not
rely, for example, on utilitarian measures, like their estimates of the dan-
gerousness of the offender or the deterrent effect of a death sentence.
Further, as a measure of offender deserts, a "culpability" or "blamewor-
thiness" standard is distinguishable from what we might call a "moral
merit" standard, which would evaluate the offender's "soul" based on all
of his life's works. Nonetheless, in the end, concluding that "culpability"
was the appropriate normative standard, even if correct, did not solve the
methodological problem; defining "culpability" or "blameworthiness"
still involved highly subjective judgments.
Because of uncertainty as to how "culpability" should be defined, the
researchers used two general approaches, each comprising several meas-
ures.6' The first, an a priori approach, requires identifying the criteria
that one believes "should govern" the appropriate sentence. 62 The au-
thors explain that they developed one culpability index based on the
number of case characteristics that made the offender death-eligible
under the post-Furman statute.63 They also used a more refined a priori
approach involving their own judgments about relevant non-statutory ag-
gravating and mitigating factors for grading culpability levels among all
armed-robbery murder cases." The second approach, described as em-
pirical, attempts to identify those legitimate case characteristics that best
explain observed sentencing outcomes. This method focuses on deter-
mining the legitimate explanations for actual results rather than on defin-
ing criteria that one believes should determine the verdicts.65 The
occurred after arrest should not be considered mitigating evidence). The Court, however,
has not consistently pursued this objective. See infra notes 199-216 and accompanying
text.
61. Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 47-57.
62. Id. at 47.
63. They concede that they could not appropriately deem cases to be "similar" based
simply on the presence of any one of the particular aggravating factors listed in the Geor-
gia statute. There would remain too many other factors that would likely influence the
outcome of cases that could not be classified under the particular statutory factor. See id.
at 48.
64. They do not clarify the list of aggravating and mitigating factors that they
thought relevant or the weight they assigned to each factor. See id. at 49.
65. In the final analysis, the a priori method for grading the culpability level of cases
is so dependent on subjective judgments as to render doubtful the value of the authors'
efforts to assess consistency under it. Professor Radin has described the conundrum:
There is a deep philosophical problem here, because it appears that the judg-
ment of equality ultimately rests on a judgment of fit. The observer must fit the
description/moral evaluation to each particular case in order to collect a set of
particular cases under a single description. But if, as I [argue] . . ., we cannot
accept the notion of ineluctable direct fit between a particular case and moral
status, neither can we make an acceptable judgment about equal treatment as
long as this is its basis.
Radin, supra note 5, at 1169 n.5.
I also argue later that the authors' empirical approach to measuring culpability is thor-
oughly flawed principally because there is no basis to believe that Georgia prosecutors or
capital jurors base their sentencing decisions purely on assessments of culpability. See
infra notes 208-13 and accompanying text.
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authors used two empirical measures. One involved a classification sys-
tem that focused on three general dimensions: 1) the certainty that the
defendant is a deliberate killer; 2) the existence of a close prior relation-
ship between the defendant and the victim; and 3) the vileness or hei-
nousness of the killing.66 The second method involved using statistical
regression analysis to determine the importance of numerous factors in
explaining the outcomes in the cases and then eliminating those factors
the researchers deemed illegitimate.67 The remaining factors could be
used to rate individual cases on a "culpability" index and to group cases
together according to their scores on that index.6"
Using a variety of fairly arbitrary categories for subdividing groups of
"similar" cases,69 the authors obtained what they deemed consistent out-
comes when they measured variously for arbitrariness and racial discrim-
ination. With regard to arbitrariness, they concluded generally that the
post-Furman system showed improvements over the pre-Furman system,
but still produced unacceptable results.7" They found that under both
systems, death sentences were imposed in only a small fraction of cases
involving a murder conviction, though the rate was somewhat higher in
the post-Furman system after excluding those cases in which no statu-
66. This classification system was developed by Professor Arnold Barnett, who served
as a consultant to the National Center for State Courts Proportionality Review Project.
See Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 51. To create the system, Professor Barnett evaluated
the facts and circumstances of each case in the PRS (using 100 to 300 word summaries
prepared by others) in light of the sentence imposed. Professor Barnett categorized the
cases on each of the three dimensions based on the presence or absence of thirty-five
variables. See id. at 51-52, 575. Each case was given a score of "0," "1," or "2" as to
each general dimension. This approach produced a total of eighteen categories of poten-
tially "similar" cases, which could then be evaluated for evidence of arbitrariness or dis-
crimination. See id. at 52. The details of this system of classification were previously
explained in Barnett, Some Distribution Patterns for the Georgia Death Sentence, 18 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 1327 (1985).
67. The authors include the codebook used to collect the data for this analysis in
Appendix C. See Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 479-93. They also list the variables
derived from the original data in Appendix D. See id. at 494-511. The authors con-
ducted a statistical analysis for each of the following outcomes:
(a) pre-Furman death-sentencing decisions among defendants convicted of mur-
der at trial; (b) post-Furman death-sentencing decisions among defendants con-
victed of murder at trial; (c) post-Furman decisions by prosecutors to seek a
death sentence for defendants convicted of murder at trial; and (d) post-Furman
jury decisions to impose a death sentence in a penalty trial.
Id. at 56-57. The authors present the results of this analysis in Appendix J. See id. at
587-601.
68. Under this method, cases that involved quite different facts might end up with the
same culpability score. For example, a case with both substantial aggravating and miti-
gating factors might end up with precisely the same culpability score as a case with no
special aggravating or mitigating factors. See id. at 52-57.
69. For example, in one instance, the authors divided the cases into six categories; in
another, they divided them into three categories; in another they divided them into 16
categories; and in another, they divided them into five categories. See id. at 84-97.
70. See generally id. at 80-139 (the data show "randomness, caprice, and excessive-
ness" in Georgia's capital sentencing system).
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tory aggravating factor appeared. 7 While not proving the absence of
rational factors to explain who received death sentences, these statistics
undermined the notion articulated in Gregg that prosecutors and juries
would regularly impose the death penalty under the revised system
where one of the statutory aggravating factors existed.72 Moreover,
under all methods they employed for defining "similar" cases, the au-
thors identified a large percentage of death sentences in both the pre- and
post-Furman systems that were "presumptively excessive,"7 3 and only a
small fraction that appeared "evenhanded."7" At the same time, they
found fewer problematic sentences and more acceptable sentences under
the post-Furman system, though the extent of the improvement de-
pended heavily on the culpability measure employed.75
As for discrimination, the PRS revealed improvements from the pre-
to post-Furman periods regarding race-of-defendant discrimination, but
little change regarding race-of-victim discrimination.76 Analysis of the
pre-Furman data using a variety of methods for identifying "similar"
cases identified substantial state-wide discrimination against black de-
fendants and against those defendants whose victims were white.' This
71. The death sentencing rate among cases involving a murder conviction under the
pre-Furman system was .15 (44/294). See id. at 80. Under the post-Furman system, the
rate was .19 (112/606) for all cases involving a conviction, but .23 (112/483) among those
cases in which the researchers concluded that at least one of the statutory aggravating
factors were present. See id. at 88-89. The requirement of an aggravating factor insulated
a few more than 100 defendants from death eligibility. See id. at 89.
72. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
74. See id.
75. On this point, the authors summarize their conclusions as follows:
From the perspective of the largely intuitive measure that we used to rank pre-
and post-Furman armed-robbery-murder cases, there is a sharp decline in the
percentage of clearly excessive sentences, from 100 percent to 24 percent. By
this measure, however, there was only a slight increase in the proportion of
presumptively evenhanded death sentences (from 0 percent to 15 percent). By
contrast, when we evaluated the pre- and post-Furman systems using the empir-
ical measures of case culpability, we found a sharp decline in the proportion of
presumptively excessive sentences (from 43 percent to 13 percent) and a sub-
stantial increase in the proportion of presumptively evenhanded sentences (from
23 percent to 51 percent).
Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 97. Although not noted in this summary, the authors
found that when they employed the Barnett classification system, see supra note 66, they
identified "a higher proportion of presumptively excessive sentences, .33 (37/113), than
the .13 (15/113) for cases matched by [their] regression-based case culpability index."
Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 95.
The authors also point out that even analyzing the post-Furman system under the
statistically produced culpability index, nearly one-half (55/112) of the death sentences
issued fell within groups of similar cases in which death sentences were not regularly
imposed. See id. at 92.
76. See generally id. at 140-97 (showing decline of post-Furman race of defendant
discrimination from the data, but no decline in race of victim discrimination).
77. The two racial factors each exerted a significant independent influence on the
results of the pre-Furman system. See id. at 143. (The text of the book refers to this data
as bearing on the "post-Furman" system, but the references to tabular material reveal
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discrimination occurred almost exclusively in cases in the mid-range of
culpability.78 Unexpectedly, there was little evidence of discrimination
based on the socioeconomic status of the defendant and victim. 9 By
contrast, the post-Furman data reflected no state-wide discrimination
against black defendants."0 This conclusion is slightly misleading, how-
ever. Some discrimination against black defendants did appear in cases
from rural areas," but, unexpectedly, was offset by newly appearing dis-
crimination against white defendants in urban areas.8 2 Moreover, the
race-of-victim discrimination continued to appear, especially among
those cases in the mid-range of culpability.8 3 As the authors explain,
"[d]efendants whose victims were white were nearly as disadvantaged af-
ter Furman as they were before." 84
The researchers also found that the comparative proportionality re-
view conducted by the Georgia Supreme Court was wholly ineffective in
relieving the arbitrariness and discrimination that they had identified.85
The authors note that since 1973, the Georgia Supreme Court has only
vacated two death sentences on grounds that they were "excessive or
disproportionate." Moreover, in both cases, the court relied on a ration-
ale other than the dissimilarity between the sentence and sentences im-
posed in other similar cases generally. In one, the defendant had
received a life sentence in a previous trial; in the other, the offender's co-
that the authors actually are discussing the pre-Furman system.) The researchers esti-
mated that the odds that a black defendant would receive the death sentence were twelve
times higher than for a white defendant with similar culpability scores. They estimated
that the odds that a defendant who killed a white person would receive a death sentence
were 4.3 times higher than for a defendant with the same culpability score who killed a
black person. See id.
78. While the figures in the preceding note concern all cases, the authors demonstrate
that both of these patterns of discrimination are not uniform across the cases, but arise
principally in cases in the midaggravation range. See id. at 144 table 27, 145, 146 table
28.
79. See id. at 185.
80. See id. at 149. The authors conclude: "the gap between the death-sentencing rates
for the black-defendant/white-victim cases and white-defendant/white-victim cases
dropped from 23 points (.31-.08) pre-Furman to 13 points (.35-.22) post-Furman;
moreover, among the post-Furman death-eligible cases, the disparity is only 5 points." Id.
In reviewing the results of the PRS, the authors do not discuss whether, among the
white victim cases, there is a disparity against black defendants. In the subsequent study
that they conducted, however, they noted such a disparity. See infra note 103 and ac-
companying text.
81. The authors report that even this discrimination against black defendants in rural
areas was not statistically significant. See id. at 179. Although they identified significant
discrimination against black defendants by rural prosecutors, this punitive attitude was
substantially neutralized by the actions of rural juries. See Equal Justice, supra note 15,
at 183.
82. Id. at 179.
83. Id. at 154 table 32. See also id. at 145 (noting that this pattern appears in both the
pre- and post-Furman cases).
84. Id. at 150.




perpetrator received a life sentence although the defendant was the actual
triggerperson1 6 The authors note, as have others before them, 7 that the
Georgia court appears to have failed to pursue a workable approach for
identifying a death sentence that is "comparatively excessive." 8 The
court has generally only asked whether there have been some minimum
number of death sentences for a particular category of murder-such as
"domestic slayings"-without regard to the number of life sentences im-
posed.8 9 Nonetheless, the researchers found that the Georgia Supreme
Court is more likely to vacate a conviction or death sentence in cases in
which the offender is not highly culpable than in one where he is highly
culpable. Of course, this may be true in part because procedural errors in
sentencing trials are more likely to result in a finding of harmless error
where the crime appears highly aggravated.' But the authors conclude
that, while this defacto system of comparative sentence review eliminates
some excessive death sentences, it leaves most intact.91
After completing the PRS, the researchers decided to conduct a sec-
ond study of the Georgia system focusing exclusively on discrimination,
particularly based on racial factors. The idea of "arbitrariness" or "ca-
priciousness" seemingly condemned by each of the majority Justices in
Furman was never defined by the Court and, thus, difficult to know how
to measure. But, the notion of "discrimination" based on a particular
illegitimate factor such as race, connoted a much clearer problem. More-
over, if an even more thorough study of the Georgia system revealed
systematic, racially based discrimination, those findings would appear to
conflict with "much of what Furman has been understood to stand for
over the past fifteen years." 92 Members of the capital defense bar93 also
persuaded the researchers that evidence from a more expansive study fo-
86. Id. at 203.
87. See, eg., Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 Geo. L.J. 97
(1979) (criticizing the appellate review process in Georgia, Florida, and Texas and sug-
gesting that a uniform system for individualized sentencing may be impossible to
achieve).
88. Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 203-15.
89. Id. at 209.
90. The authors misstate the effect of harmless error doctrine, surely inadvertently.
They state that "procedural errors in the more aggravated cases are less likely to result in
a finding of harmless error." Id. at 214 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 214-15. The authors note that subsequent federal habeas corpus review
resulted in reversals of convictions or death sentences in many of the cases in the PRS.
See id. at 215. Of course, the percentage of reversals in federal habeas is much lower now
because of the doctrines developed by the Supreme Court that prevent federal habeas
courts from reaching the merits of most claims by state court prisoners. See generally W.
White, supra note 5, at 14-22 (discussing doctrines of retroactivity and procedural
default).
92. Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 348.
93. The authors undertook this second study in 1980 at the request of the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund, whose attorneys represented numerous death-row inmates, includ-
ing several on Georgia's death row. The authors understood that the results of the study
might be used to challenge the constitutionality of the Georgia capital punishment sys-
tem. See id. at 44.
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cused on discrimination might support a successful constitutional chal-
lenge to the Georgia capital sentencing system.
This second investigation, which the authors call the "Charging and
Sentencing Study" ("CSS") focused only on post-Furman cases, but was
more expansive than the PRS in two important ways. First, it measured
for discrimination "in the flow of cases from the point of indictment up
to and including the penalty-trial death-sentencing decision."94 Com-
pared to the PRS, this focus expanded backward from the point of con-
viction to include the guilt-or-innocence trial and the plea-bargaining
decision by the prosecutor.95 This expanded view would allow the re-
searchers to measure inconsistency over a broader segment of the selec-
tion process, as they contend Furman warranted. 96 Secondly, the CSS
attempted even more thoroughly than the PRS to respond to the inevita-
ble "omitted variable" contention-the notion that one or more unidenti-
fied, legitimate factors bearing on offender culpability could also
correlate coincidentally with race and, thus, explain discrepancies seem-
ingly based on race. To tackle this problem, the researchers collected
94. Id. at 45.
95. There was some doubt about whether Furman's perceived mandate of even-
handedness extended this broadly or only applied to those defendants actually convicted
of a capital offense. See discussion supra note 30. See generally Note, supra note 21, at
1713 (noting that Furman "can be read to support either a narrow or broad interpreta-
tion of the cruel and unusual punishment clause"). The authors of Equal Justice and the
Death Penalty conclude unqualifiedly that Furman required even-handed treatment of
capital defendants at all of these stages. See Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 28. How-
ever, the Furman opinions of Justices Stewart and White were less than clear on this
point. See Note, supra note 21, at 1713. Moreover, Justice Stewart's opinion in Gregg,
428 U.S. at 188, certainly cast doubt on the authors' conclusions, though his remarks
there were themselves qualified by his opinion issued the same day in Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). In Woodson, Justice Stewart, in a plurality opinion, re-
jected statutes mandating the death penalty upon conviction in part because they en-
couraged "nullification" by juries in the guilt-or-innocence stages of capital proceedings.
See id. at 302-03.
96. See supra note 95.
This expansion would also address the possible criticism that the PRS reflected "sam-
ple selection bias," creating an exaggerated appearance of discrimination at the post-con-
viction stages. See generally S. Gross & R. Mauro, supra note 9, at 24-26. This effect
could have occurred, for example, if unexpected discrimination in favor of defendants in
white victim cases at stages up to and including conviction produced a group of convic-
tions in which defendants' culpability tended to be higher in white victim cases.
However, even if such discrimination against killers of blacks had occurred at the pre-
conviction stages, thus producing such a sample, because the PRS adjusted for culpability
based on numerous factors and according to varying measures, the disparities in culpabil-
ity levels should not have influenced the results. It is only if there were omitted variables
that related both to the offender's culpability and to the racial factor that the sample
selection bias would have distorted the PRS results. Moreover, the expected effect of
sample selection bias in this context, of course, would be just the opposite: discrimination
at early stages against defendants in white victim cases would tend to produce a group of
conviction cases in which the defendant's culpability was lower in white victim cases.
Adjusting for culpability levels among this group of cases before measuring for racial
effects would then produce results that masked the discrimination that produced the sam-
ple. See id. at 25.
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information on dozens of factors concerning each case and each defend-
ant to control for even more variables than the already sizeable number
covered in the PRS.9 7
The suspicions of the average observer about racial discrimination in
Georgia's capital selection process probably would be aroused merely by
the unadjusted disparities in sentencing rates between different racial
groupings. The following table reveals the rates for the universe of all
persons indicted for murder in Georgia between 1973 and 1979, broken
down by racial categories: 9
Defendant/Victim Racial Composition Death Sentencing Rates
1. Black defendant/white victim (B/W) .21 (50/233)
2. White defendant/white victim (W/W) .08 (58/748)
3. Black defendant/black victim (B/B) .01 (18/1443)
4. White defendant/black victim (,V/B) .03 (2/60)
TOTAL .05 (128/2484)
These tables demonstrate a strong disparity against defendants whose
victims were white. There is no overall disparity against black defend-
ants-indeed, the disparity is heavily in their favor. At the same time,
the vast majority of the victims of black defendants were black. In the
white-victim cases, black defendants received death sentences at a rate
more than two and one-half times the rate of white defendants. Nonethe-
less, while cause for serious suspicion, these statistics do not prove racial
discrimination, for the same reason that the "omitted variable" argument
always plagues efforts to identify discrimination in capital sentencing:
factors that bear on offender culpability but that correspond with the
racial factors could conceivably explain the disparities.
The authors contend that the nature and number of the variables in-
cluded in the CSS substantially enhance the probability that any racially
disparate impacts identified result from racial discrimination. The core
model employed in the CSS controlled for thirty-nine distinct, legitimate
variables. The researchers report that statistical analysis demonstrated
that this model best explained observed sentencing patterns. 99 However,
the researchers also used other models to confirm the results of this core
model, including one that controlled for 230 variables. "
97. While the PRS had involved the collection of data regarding approximately 150
factors, see supra note 55, the CSS involved the collection of data concerning approxi-
mately 230 variables. See Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 46. The authors present the
instrument used to log this data in Appendix E of the book. See id. at 512-48.
98. This table partially reproduces one presented by the authors. See id. at 315 table
50.
99. See id. at 316.
100. The authors explain that the 39-variable model was the most appropriate in their
view because of the problem of "redundant" variables. This problem arises when so
many variables are stated that it becomes impossible to prevent overlaps of information
between them. If multiple variables include essentially similar information, the influence
of the variables on outcomes can be misdiagnosed. See id. at 457-58.
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The authors found substantial disparities based on racial factors con-
sistent with the unadjusted results. They estimated that a defendant who
killed a white person was, for that reason alone, 4.3 times more likely to
receive a death sentence than a defendant whose victim was black.10
Regarding race-of-defendant discrimination, they estimated that black
defendants had a slight advantage over white defendants when all cases
were considered. 10 2 However, they determined that among the white-
victim cases, a black defendant was 2.4 times more likely to receive a
death sentence than a white defendant.10 a As with the PRS, the racial
disparities measured in the CSS arose primarily among those cases in the
mid-aggravation range of offender culpability."°
Assuming the statistical methodology of the study was sound, does the
CSS tend to establish systematic discrimination based on racial factors?
Different readers may have different reactions, but for me, the research-
ers' evidence greatly enhanced suspicions (based on the unadjusted find-
ings) that the race of the victim influenced sentencer judgments.
Granted, the capital sentencer's assessment is highly fact-specific and
thus it is impossible to control all variables that might influence every
sentencing decision. Nonetheless, it is difficult to conceive of any legiti-
mate variable omitted from this study that regularly would bear on the
defendant's culpability and correlate with the race of the victim. That
the disparity against black defendants in white victim cases could be ex-
plained by an omitted-variable theory appears especially unlikely.
Experts for the State and ultimately the Federal District Court in Mc-
Cleskey challenged the statistical methodology of the study. 0 5 In Equal
Justice and the Death Penalty, however, the authors respond at length to
each of the methodological criticisms. The authors provide what struck
me, a reader untrained in statistical research, as plausible rebuttals to
each of the objections. 106 However, judgments about the validity of the
methodologies are most appropriately informed by the views of disinter-
ested social scientists, as some of the discussion involves sophisticated
problems in statistical technique.107
101. See id. at 316.
102. See id. at 328.
103. See id. The authors also note that in categories of highly aggravated, white-victim
cases, black defendants were 3.1 times more likely to receive a death sentence than a
white defendant. See id.
104. Of course, within that range, the disparities are much greater than the measured
effects among all cases. See id. at 320-23.
105. The District Court concluded that even if valid, the evidence was insufficient to
establish the necessary purposeful discrimination under the fourteenth amendment or a
claim of arbitrariness under the eighth amendment. See McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp.
338, 379 (N.D. Ga. 1984). The District Court, however, also rejected McCleskey's claim
on grounds that the database was flawed and that the statistical methodologies used to
analyze the data were unreliable. See id.
106. The discussion is presented in an appendix, entitled McCleskey v. Kemp: A Meth-
odological Critique of the District Court's Decision. See Equal Justice, supra note 15, at
450-78.
107. See, e.g., id. at 459-60 (authors' contention that stepwise regression was not used
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Assuming the validity of the CSS, however, its results certainly conflict
with the view that Furman and Gregg mandated "reasonable consis-
tency" ' in the distribution of death sentences among capital offenders.
The high levels of racial disparities revealed simply do not allow for char-
acterization of the post-Furman system as significantly protecting against
reliance on illegitimate factors. Thus, the Supreme Court's indifference
to the Baldus evidence in McCleskey calls for skepticism about whether
promoting evenhandedness was a serious objective of the Court's effort to
regulate capital sentencing.
Justice Powell's majority opinion in McCleskey also openly rejects the
notion that the Constitution requires eradication of statistically estab-
lished arbitrariness and discrimination from a capital selection process.
McCleskey raised independent challenges to his death sentence under
both the eighth amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the four-
teenth amendment. However, the inability of his statistics to demon-
strate purposeful discrimination by his prosecutor or jury subverted his
fourteenth amendment claim." 9 His eighth amendment argument was
in mechanical fashion in the studies); id. at 461-63 (authors' conclusion that severe mul-
ticollinearity did not exist in the studies).
A number of eminent social scientists have endorsed the methodological soundness of
the Baldus study. See Brief Amici Curiae for Dr. Franklin M. Fisher, Dr. Richard 0.
Lempert, Dr. Peter W. Sperlich, Dr. Marvin E. Wolfgang, Professor Hans Zeisel & Pro-
fessor Franklin E. Zimring in Support of Petitioner Warren McCleskey at 3, McCleskey
(No. 84-6811).
108. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 222 (White, J., concurring).
109. The Court rejected McCleskey's fourteenth amendment claim on grounds that the
equal protection clause required proof "that the decisionmakers in his case acted with
discriminatory purpose." McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 (emphasis in original). That con-
clusion would not foreclose the possibility of using statistical analysis of a particular pros-
ecutor's dispositions of numerous previous capital cases to make out a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in a case that he prosecuted. Cf. International Bhd. of Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361 (1977) (statistical proof of class-wide discrimina-
tion by particular employer can make out prima facie case of purposeful discrimination
under Title VII, though relief in individual cases must be conditioned on some additional
case-specific showing of purposeful discrimination). The Court could easily reject the
notion, however, that system-wide, statistical evidence like that in the Baldus studies
tended to establish, even as a prima facie matter, an intent to discriminate on the part of
the particular actors in McCleskey's case. The prosecutor and jury in a death sentencing
case can be viewed as disconnected decisionmakers, acting independently from the deci-
sionmakers in other capital cases. The authors contend that the decision in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters invites a different outcome in McCleskey, see Equal Justice,
supra note 15, at 371-72, though I see the two decisions as reconcilable.
With the exception already noted, I agree with the authors' conclusion that, to make
out an Equal Protection violation after McCleskey, capital defendants "must demonstrate
the existence of purposeful discrimination based upon admissions by biased prosecutors
or jurors or by circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent affecting their individual
cases, without reference to evidence of class-wide discrimination against their racial
group." Id. at 371. I also agree that "[b]y so limiting capital punishment equal-protec-
tion claims, the Court in McCleskey created a nearly insuperable barrier to proof." Id. at
370.
For the view that McCleskey was consistent with earlier precedent concerning the
Equal Protection clause, but that the theory embodied in that precedent was inadequate
as a response to racial oppression, see Kennedy, supra note 8, at 1402-21. Cf. Lawrence,
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perhaps more hopeful; certainly that is the theory for eradicating arbi-
trariness and discrimination upon which Equal Justice and the Death
Penalty concentrates. Nonetheless, on this issue, the Court concluded
that there was no eighth amendment problem even accepting the validity
of the researchers' conclusions. 1 10 Inexplicably, after assuming the valid-
ity of the studies, Justice Powell denied that they established a risk of
racial discrimination in McCleskey's case. At one point, he declared that
the study only demonstrated a "discrepancy that appears to correlate"
with race,1 1 and that the Court would not "assume that what is unex-
plained is invidious."' 12 Yet, ultimately, he also rejected the very notion
that the eighth amendment proscribed "arbitrariness" or "discrimina-
tion," at least as it was revealed by the Baldus research." 3 After con-
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L.
Rev. 317, 327 (1987)(criticizing the requirement of proof of purposeful discrimination to
make out equal protection violations).
For the view that the Court also erred by not recognizing that the primary "equal
protection" problem presented in McCleskey was a failure to provide equal protection to
blacks in their capacity as murder victims rather than a failure to provide equal treatment
to McCleskey as a member of some cognizable group, see Kennedy, supra note 8, at 1421-
28; Carter, When Victims Happen to be Black, 97 Yale L.J. 420, 423-24 (1988).
110. 481 U.S. at 315-19. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice
Marshall and joined in part by Justice Blackmun and Stevens. See id. at 320 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Marshall
and Stevens and joined in part by Justice Brennan. See id. at 345 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Stevens also filed a dissenting opinion that Justice Blackmun joined. See id.
at 366. For a summary of these opinions, see Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 349-50. For
a favorable analysis of Justice Brennan's dissent, see Pokorak, "Death Stands Con-
demned:"Justice Brennan and the Death Penalty, 27 Cal. W.L. Rev. 239, 301-07 (1991).
Justices Blackmun and Stevens concluded that the constitutional problems with the
Georgia system could be satisfactorily remedied by narrowing the group of death-eligible
offenders to highly aggravated murders in which death sentences are usually imposed.
See 481 U.S. at 365 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This
approach has been termed the "worst-case-only" solution. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note
8, at 1430, n. 196 (existence of three categories of murder, with the murderers sentenced
to death in only the most egregious cases). Of course, consistent with their views in
Furman, Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that the death penalty should be in-
validated altogether under the eighth amendment. See 481 U.S. at 320 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
111. 481 U.S. at 312.
112. Id. at 313.
113. In dealing with McCleskey's Equal Protection claim, the Court alluded to the
impossibility of even identifying "arbitrariness" under the eighth amendment. In distin-
guishing the capital selection process from jury venire-selection or Title VII cases, Justice
Powell had declared that there is "no common standard" by which a court can "evaluate
all defendants who have or have not received the death penalty." McCleskey, 481 U.S. at
293-95. This suggests that one of the basic assumptions employed by the researchers, see
supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text, is simply incorrect: that offender "culpability"
is the measure to be employed by decision makers in the death selection process. Justice
Powell is correct that the holdings in the Court's capital-sentencing decisions do not
correspond to that basic assumption. See infra notes 201-17 and accompanying text.
Yet, this is truly the central failing in the Court's efforts to regulate capital sentencing
standards: it has not required a judgment from the sentencer that the offender's culpabil-
ity is such that he deserves the death penalty. That should be the central protection
offered by the eighth amendment. See infra notes 214-15 and accompanying text. Of
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eluding that the capital sanction did not appear excessive in McCleskey's
case, Justice Powell declared that it was simply irrelevant under the Con-
stitution that "other defendants who may be similarly situated did not
receive the death penalty."'114
The authors of Equal Justice and the Death Penalty imply that the
Court in McCleskey wrongly decided the eighth amendment question.
They conclude that the decision cannot be reconciled with Furman and
Gregg." This conclusion coincides with their view that an assurance of
"reasonable consistency" is the only explanation for regulating capital
sentencing under the eighth amendment. Perhaps for this reason, they
ultimately abandon legal analysis in their quest to explain McCleskey,
suggesting instead simply that political expediencies probably account
for the decision." 6 However, the authors never attempt to justify their
view of the eighth amendment from a normative perspective. Indeed,
one arrives rather abruptly at the end of the book"' lacking answers to
some fundamental questions. The Georgia death selection system dis-
criminates based on improper factors. But what is the price of pursuing
enhanced consistency as the overriding objective of constitutional regula-
tion? Moreover, why should a prohibition on "cruel and unusual" pun-
ishment demand equality in the distribution of death sentences?
II. REEVALUATING THE OBJECTIVE OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT
REGULATION
I find the authors' legal analysis of the McCleskey claim troubling in
course, this is a more limited requirement than the one which the Baldus researchers
assume for the eighth amendment-that capital offenders of relatively equal culpability
should generally receive the same sentence.
As the authors point out, however, Justice Powell wants to have it both ways. At
another point in his McCleskey opinion, he declares that the Baldus evidence supports the
view that death sentences in Georgia generally do comport with notions of culpability, as
if that were required. See 481 U.S. at 313, n. 36.
114. Id. at 307.
115. See Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 348:
When addressing the eighth amendment issues in McCleskey, Justice Powell
did not explicitly overrule Furman, nor did he appear to have intended to do so.
Nevertheless, his discussion of the meaning of excessiveness and disproportion-
ality under the eighth amendment repudiates much of what Furman has been
understood to stand for over the past fifteen years.
The authors seem also to conclude that the rest of what Furman had been understood to
stand for already had been repudiated. See id. at 406. See also id. at 414 (indicating that
the Court "gave up" on the goal of ensuring "consistency" in capital sentencing).
116. One wonders, of course, why a majority of the Court gave up.... Some
justices may also believe that, while the Court could improve the fairness of the
system, doing so would require cumbersome, disruptive, and time-consuming
procedures and would frustrate a perceived public demand for the resumption
of routine executions. This latter hypothesis appears most plausible to us.
Id. at 414-15.
117. The authors end the book merely by asserting the ill effects of inequity in the
distribution of death sentences and by noting the gloomy prospect that governmental
bodies other than the federal judiciary will step in to cure the problem. See id. at 416-19.
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two general respects. First, the authors fail to address the problems with
adjudicating the continuing constitutional validity of a capital sentencing
system based on its tendency to produce a statistically measured equity
of outcomes. The view that the Constitution demands statistical consis-
tency in the distribution of death sentences is much more problematic
than the authors let on. Secondly, claims building on the need to en-
hance equality of treatment among those who deserve the death penalty
are properly grounded on the fourteenth amendment. The arguments,
commonly made after Furman, that equality was the eighth amendment
objective for regulation were always incoherent.'" More importantly,
these arguments tend to obscure the true eighth amendment objective for
regulating capital sentencing: ensuring that death sentences are imposed
only on those who deserve them.
A. The Problems With Statistical Measures of Equality as a Basis for
Adjudicating the Validity of Capital Sentencing Systems
The authors' view that capital sentencing regulation under the Consti-
tution aims to ensure statistical equality in the distribution of death
sentences is troubling. First, pursuing equality through statistical meas-
ures of distribution disparities would make constitutional adjudication
intractably difficult for the courts. Moreover, the authors fail to explain
why they do not advocate doing away with the death penalty,"19 since
abolition is a simple resolution to the problem, and the only method
available for ensuring perfect equality in the distribution of death
sentences. They apparently assume, though it is unclear why, that equal-
ity is merely an aspiration to be balanced against a perceived need to
allow some death sentences. Furthermore, the authors' approach to reg-
ulation arguably is theoretically unsound. I do not mean to suggest ap-
probation of the Court's failure, after rejecting the abolitionist course, to
take serious steps to protect against racial discrimination in capital sen-
tencing. If the Court had demanded that states impose procedural pro-
tections against discrimination as a condition to the resumption of capital
sentencing, the extreme racial disparities revealed in the Baldus studies
probably could have been avoided. Nonetheless, it is worth acknowledg-
ing that, if our society is to use the death penalty, there are benefits to
allowing decisionmakers wide discretion to grant reprieves; benefits that
118. I do not deny that a basis existed in some of the Justices' capital-sentencing opin-
ions to support the authors' position, and, of course, that view was even endorsed by four
dissenting Justices in McCleskey.
119. We continue to believe that the promise of Gregg v. Georgia may not be
impossible to achieve, and that the disinclination of state appellate courts, thus
far, to provide rational and evenhanded sentencing in capital cases is attributa-
ble not to inherent inability, but an understandable reluctance of state supreme
courts to confront and remedy the difficult problems of arbitrariness and dis-
crimination in capital sentencing in their jurisdictions when the United States
Supreme Court does not specifically require them to do so.
See Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 409.
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are not necessarily outweighed by the benefits of promoting statistical
consistency.
The authors do not clarify the contours of the proscription against
arbitrariness and discrimination in capital sentencing that they perceive
in the Constitution. At several points, they suggest in general terms how
they think these problems could be remedied short of abolition. They
suggest, for example, that Georgia could maintain its current approach
of allowing prosecutors and sentencers unfettered discretion to grant re-
prieves, but restrict the possibility of the death penalty to murders in-
volving certain "aggravating circumstances" that statistical evidence
reveals will regularly result in that sanction.'" The authors also note
that Georgia could require its appellate court to use comparative propor-
tionality review, employing essentially the same analysis as the authors'
studies, to weed out excessive death sentences. 2 ' Yet the authors do not
clarify what they believe the Constitution requires.
If seeking statistical consistency is the goal of constitutional regula-
tion, as the authors contend, there is a need to know the minimal level of
consistency that the Constitution demands. The authors conclude that
the Constitution does not command consistency to the point of produc-
ing defacto abolition. Yet, no one doubts that inequities inevitably will
occur in the use of the death penalty." Consequently, a fundamental
line-drawing problem arises, but the authors offer no suggestions about
how to resolve it.123 Although not fatal by itself to their theory, the diffi-
culty of deciding just how much inconsistency the Constitution allows
only begins to tell of the definitional problems that inhere in their theory.
Serious uncertainty also remains about how the existence of arbitrari-
ness or discrimination ought to be statistically measured for constitu-
tional purposes. Do we measure on a state-wide basis, by region or
county, or based on a rural-versus-urban distinction? Should we include
only cases in which the offender was convicted of a capital offense, all
120. A ruling in McCleskey that limited death sentencing to only those cases in
which death sentences are routinely sought and imposed would have imported a
greater degree of rationality and consistency into state death-sentencing systems




122. See, eg., Hubbard, supra note 5, at 1121 (asserting that any criminal justice sys-
tem will inevitably produce results based at least in part on irrelevant factors).
123. The authors' proposal, see supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text, adopts the
"worst-case-only" solution proposed by Justices Stevens and Blackmun in McCleskey, see
supra note 110, to solve the inconsistency problem. However, as Professor Kennedy
pointed out several years ago, this proposed remedy simply "replicates the intractable
line-drawing problems that have beset the Court's post-Furman approach to capital pun-
ishment jurisprudence.... The notorious indeterminacy involved in applying statutory
aggravating circumstances in the penalty phase of a capital trial or in applying propor-
tionality review to death sentences would be compounded by the requirement that appel-
late courts distinguish worst-case murders from those in the so-called middle range."
Kennedy, supra note 8, at 1431-32.
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cases in which the offender was indicted for a capital offense, or all cases
in which the person appeared chargeable with a capital crime? Over
what minimum period, if any, should we measure the results of a capital
selection system? Three years? Five years? Ten Years? The authors do
not offer a definitive position on any of these questions. Of course, we
cannot reject their view that the Constitution demands substantially
more statistical consistency than the Georgia system provides merely be-
cause they do not resolve all of these issues. The authors surely would
contend that the Georgia system contains far too much arbitrariness and
discrimination under any combination of these variables. Nonetheless,
manipulating the variables could have dispositive effects in the evaluation
of capital sentencing systems in other states or in a revised system in
Georgia, and the difficulty of choosing among them is cause for skepti-
cism about the plausibility of a statistical consistency objective as a basis
for judicial regulation.
Finally, for purposes of measuring "arbitrariness," just what is the
standard for distinguishing among capital cases and for deciding how we
should group cases as "similar?" The authors do not provide a definitive
answer. 124
As for identifying discrimination, the authors also fail to clarify how to
decide who should get relief within any class deemed to have borne death
penalties with inappropriate disproportionality. They concede the valid-
ity of Justice Powell's point in McCleskey '2 5-that the effect of allowing
a strictly statistical model of proof would be to overturn many death
sentences that were not in fact the product of prohibited discrimina-
tion.126 The authors appear to concede that it would be inappropriate
even to invalidate all death sentences imposed on blacks who killed
whites in Georgia after Furman. They suggest a "hybrid approach,"
which contemplates a "case-by-case inquiry into the specifics of each case
as a basis for awarding relief."' 127 However, the authors' proposal 2 cre-
124. As noted earlier, the authors conclude that "culpability" should be the standard
for distinguishing among capital offenders. However, they offer extraordinarily varied
views of what "culpability" means, see text supra notes 60-67, and the definition em-
ployed is consequential. See discussion supra note 75.
125. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293.
126. See Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 372.
127. See id. In this context, the authors are speaking of fourteenth amendment reme-
dies. They suggest that evidence of class-wide discrimination should have a different con-
sequence under the eighth amendment. They suggest that it "would appear to compel the
reversal of any death sentences imposed by such a system." Id. at 376. However, they
offer questionable support for their view that this difference is "compel[led]" by earlier
eighth amendment decisions. Id. The authors cite generally to Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862 (1983). However, it is unapparent how Stephens even suggests that statistical
evidence of a risk of discrimination based on a particular factor compels the reversal of
every death sentence in which that factor exists, let alone of every death sentence imposed
by the entire system. Furthermore, the authors offer no normative argument for this
distinction between eighth and fourteenth amendment protections.
128. I have already indicated that the precedent for this "hybrid approach" arguably
would not justify its use in the capital sentencing context, if indeed the question is
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ates unresolvable problems. It admits that although the "normative stan-
dard" and "similar case" issues 2 9 can be avoided in identifying class
disparities based on particular odious factors ("discrimination"), those
issues inevitably resurface in the need to evaluate the propriety of the
death penalty in individual cases. The authors fail, however, to proffer
any workable "normative standard" or any theoretical basis for catego-
rizing cases as "similar;" hence the central flaw in their efforts to evalu-
ate individual cases to identify "arbitrariness" also undermines their
effort, after identifying group disparities, to articulate a basis for individ-
ual relief.'3 0 Indeed, as one critic has pointed out, this individualized
approach to determining appropriate relief simply poses
"the intractable line-drawing problem[] that ha[s] beset the Court's
post-Furman approach to capital punishment jurisprudence. The one
thing upon which death penalty deregulators and death penalty oppo-
nents agree is that the task of selecting in some objective way those
persons who should be condemned to die is one that remains beyond
the capabilities of the criminal justice system."'13'
More fundamental problems also would arise because of the impossi-
bility of translating the authors' goal of statistical consistency, even if it
could be clarified, into a basis for procedural rule making. Courts would
often have to pass on capital sentencing systems long before sufficient
data would exist to measure statistically whether the systems were pro-
ducing consistent outcomes. Also, once an existing system were deemed
not to be producing sufficient consistency, the courts would soon have to
confront whether a reformed system met the constitutional minimum,
which again would force them to resolve the question without the benefit
of statistical measures. Nor could the validity of a system at one point
adequately resolve its propriety for all time. As even the authors con-
cede, for example, it is impossible to measure just how much of the differ-
ences they identified in arbitrariness and discrimination between the pre-
and post-Furman Georgia systems is attributable to legislative reform
and how much simply to changing attitudes among Georgians. 32 Like-
wise, the measure of consistency produced under a particular approach
whether there exists a purpose to discriminate. In the context of a death sentencing sys-
tem in which decisionmakers are unique to each case, the finding of disparity based on a
particular odious factor does not tend to show a purpose on the part of individual deci-
sionmakers to discriminate. It thus makes out no prima facie case. The implications can
be viewed differently where the decisionmaker is the same entity for all decisions, which
describes the situation in the case on which the authors rely. See discussion supra note 9.
129. See supra notes 60-61.
130. For an explanation of the authors' approach to defining "culpability", which they
use as the normative standard, see supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text. For criti-
cism of the definitions employed, see infra note 65 and accompanying text. For an expla-
nation of the authors' basis for categorizing cases as similar, see supra notes 69-75 and
accompanying text.
131. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 1431 (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 442
(1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
132. See Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 183-84.
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in one state would not necessarily resolve the propriety of its application
in another. The same system employed in Georgia might produce very
different results when applied in Colorado. Thus, a mandate of statistical
consistency, even if it could be clarified, would not translate into a partic-
ular set of procedural protections.
Assuming the desirability of providing early and reliable rulings on the
validity of death penalty systems, problems would surely accompany an
adjudicatory approach that relied on statistical evidence about out-
comes. 133 Even the authors concede that when the Court upheld the
Georgia system and several others in 1976, it could only act on its
hunches that they would produce sufficient regularity in capital sentenc-
ing.134 Of course, the post-Furman Georgia system really instituted no
meaningful new bulwarks against improper discrimination; the Court
could have mandated more protection than the Georgia legislature pro-
vided.135 Nonetheless, in light of the necessity, conceded by the authors,
for courts to rule on a system for a substantial period without benefit of
the statistical studies, hinging the validity of the system on subsequently
developed statistical evidence largely ignores interests in the finality of
judicial decision-making.1 36
These problems lead up to the more fundamental question of whether
consistency is a required objective of efforts to regulate the distribution of
death sentences under the Constitution. The authors fail ever to make
the case for why either the eighth or the fourteenth amendment demands
consistency in the treatment of capital offenders. Having conceded that
all capital offenders justly deserve the death penalty, the authors face the
time-worn argument that the capital selection process properly can be
viewed as simply allowing the widespread extension of mercy.1 37 While
133. Cf. Hubbard, supra note 5, at 1136 (noting that using this approach, one would
have to "wait years while new data is gathered and the patterns of sentencing under the
reformed system are studied").
134. In order to apply Furman prospectively and to develop workable rules for
future cases, however, the Court necessarily shifted its focus to a procedural
mode. Thus, in Gregg, the Court decided that Georgia's revised capital-sen-
tencing procedures were constitutional because of its assessment that, if prop-
erly applied, those procedures were capable of preventing death sentences that
would offend Furman.
Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 27.
135. See, e.g., discussion infra notes 140, 245 (requiring juries to certify that they have
not considered factors such as race, ethnicity, sexual preference or place of residence in
reaching a sentencing decision).
136. The authors suggest at one point that statistical studies like those they conducted
in Georgia would rarely be carried out due to the expense involved and the difficulty in
obtaining funding. See Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 386. This contention appears
highly questionable as a response to what would have happened if the Supreme Court had
concluded that the authors' studies in Georgia provided a valid ground for attacking the
Georgia capital sentencing system. If that had occurred, it is reasonable to think that the
interest of social scientists and of private foundations in pursuing similar studies in other
death-penalty states would have increased dramatically.
137. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (Stewart, J., concurring) (rejecting
arguments against the unfettered discretion afforded decisionmakers outside the capital
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mercy falls outside the realm of rational decisionmaking that produces
justice, it is hardly obvious that opportunities for mercy in the capital
selection process should be eliminated.' Of course, there is no compel-
ling reason why the fourteenth amendment should not provide protection
against discrimination based on odious factors. The Court has recently
taken steps in that direction by regulating more closely the process of
jury voir dire and selection. 39 It could have done more. It could have
demanded, for example, that prosecutors and capital sentencers attest
that, in deciding whether to reprieve capital offenders, they have avoided
reliance on certain repugnant factors." ° Nonetheless, assuming we are
to use the death penalty to punish murder, why shouldn't the Court at
some point defer to a legislative judgment that the benefits of allowing
extensions of mercy are more valuable than the benefits of securing con-
sistency? This seems an appropriate question if we have assumed, as the
authors do, that the Constitution does not demand the kind of perfect
consistency that is unapproachable except through abolition- that it
balances the demand for consistency against the benefits of allowing
some executions.
If consistency is the overriding objective of constitutional regulation,
one also must accept that reforms that reduce the opportunity for
merciful reprieves could help solve the problem. One solution, for exam-
ple, would be to allow the death penalty to be imposed mandatorily upon
conviction for a valid capital offense.' 4 ' This approach would not ensure
consistency among all persons who have committed capital crimes be-
cause some who are guilty are, for a variety of reasons, not convicted.
However, states could also restrict prosecutorial discretion to reprieve
capital offenders. This combination of reforms could reasonably be
thought to produce more consistency than the pre-Furman systems 42 or
sentencing trial and noting that, "[n]othing in any of our cases suggests that the decision
to afford an individual defendant mercy violates the Constitution"); id. at 203 (declaring
that "the isolated decision of a jury to afford mercy" to a particular offender does not
render death sentences imposed on other offenders unconstitutional). Cf. Kalven, The
Supreme Court-Foreward, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 21-25 (1971)(characterizing the problem
of how to confine capital sentencing discretion as a choice between the rule of law and the
provision for extensions of "mercy").
138. See, e.g., Note, Reviving Mercy in the Structure of Capital Punishment, 99 Yale L
J. 389, 391 (1989)(arguing for greater infusion of merciful decisionmaking in the capital
selection process).
139. See infra notes 247-48.
140. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
141. Regarding what I mean by a "valid capital offense," see supra note 22.
142. As Justice Scalia has stated:
[The argument is made] ... that mandatory capital sentencing schemes may
suffer from the same defects that characterize absolutely discretionary schemes.
In mandatory systems, the argument goes, juries frequently acquit offenders
whom they find guilty but believe do not deserve the death penalty for their
crime; and because this "jury nullification" occurs... without the benefit of any
guidance or standards from the State, the result is the same "arbitrary and ca-
pricious imposition of death sentences" struck down in Furman. [I]fjuries will
ignore their instructions in determining guilt in a mandatory capital sentencing
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Georgia's current approach. Of course, the price includes fewer opportu-
nities for merciful reprieves-more executions. 143 The authors do not
discuss the plausibility of this solution, perhaps because they dislike re-
forms that would reduce the number of reprieves from death sentences.
However, the opportunity for merciful reprieves, more than the failure to
limit narrowly the availability of the death penalty, may be thought to
account for the inequity that the authors describe in the Georgia system.
Moreover, the Constitution does not guarantee opportunities for merciful
reprieves, so Georgia could simply eliminate them. Consequently, an in-
crease in death sentences is a potential cost of seeking more consistency.
Indeed, the only argument against allowing states to pursue this remedy
fully- by mandating the death penalty upon conviction-comes from
recognizing the true objective of eighth as distinct from fourteenth
amendment regulation. 1"
scheme, there is no reason to think they will not similarly chafe at the [stan-
dards] ... required by Furman. The Furman approach must be preferred, since
it is facially implausible that the risk of arbitrariness arising from juries' ignor-
ing their instructions is greater than the risk of arbitrariness from giving them
no instructions at all.
Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3067 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
143. One of the Justices during the oral argument in McCleskey noted: "[Tlhe claim
being made here is a curious one, in the sense that in many death penalty cases, what the
defendant comes forward asking for is more opportunities for the exercise of mercy, and
to allow juries, for whatever reason, not to impose the death penalty. And yet [the peti-
tioner] come[s] forward with a claim that says, in effect... the death penalty is not being
imposed on enough people." Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, quoted in Kennedy,
supra, note 8, at 1392 n.15.
For another approach that would produce more consistency, but also probably in-
crease the number of death sentences, see infra note 147.
144. The authors' discussion of the foundation for the Woodson/Lockett doctrine,
which is not raised in response to this problem, does not suggest any vision of why it
might reveal an entirely different and more coherent eighth amendment objective for reg-
ulating capital sentencing than to promote consistency. Their textual discussion of
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976), is limited to the following statement, which is essentially buried in a volume com-
prising 698 pages:
At the same time that the Court sustained the constitutionality of the Georgia,
Florida, and Texas statutes, it invalidated on eighth amendment grounds, the
mandatory death-sentencing procedures enacted after Furman by the legisla-
tures of Louisiana and North Carolina. The Court found these mandatory stat-
utes unconstitutional either because they denied the sentencing juries sufficient
discretion to individualize the sentencing decision or because they lacked suffi-
cient guidelines or safeguards to ensure that the discretion that the Court be-
lieved juries would inevitably exercise at the guilt trial would produce rational,
evenhanded sentencing results.
Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 26. Their discussion of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978), is even less revealing. See id. at 5 n.3, 25, 69 n.21. For an explanation of what
these decisions reveal about the purpose of eighth amendment regulation, see infra notes
172-79.
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B. The Problems with Basing Equality Goals on an Eighth
Amendment Foundation
Whatever the proper procedural protections for promoting even-
handedness in capital sentencing under the fourteenth amendment, as-
suring consistency in the treatment of those who deserve the death
penalty is not the objective of the eighth amendment. The argument for
consistency would hold that the death penalty becomes less "cruel and
unusual" when administered under a system demanding consistent
harshness than under one allowing the sentencer uninhibited freedom to
act leniently. Professor Polsby pointed out this "profound contradic-
tion" shortly after Furman. 45 The authors concede that "no one in-
volved in the criminal justice process is going to argue that the eighth
amendment requires the more frequent imposition of death
sentences."'" Perhaps they believe that no one would dare contend that
consistency should be achieved other than by narrowing the category of
death-eligible offenders. Yet the problem with their position ultimately
rests with their claim that the goal is consistency. For, as we have seen,
there certainly is no logical impediment to an argument that enhanced
consistency could best be achieved, not by narrowing the category of
death-eligible offenders, but by methods that increase the frequency with
which death sentences are inflicted. 147
I think the authors err in assuming that the goal of eighth amendment
regulation should be consistency. They might respond that Furman
must have some explanation unless it was wrongly decided, and I agree.
Nonetheless, the best explanation for Furman is not a need to promote
equality. A prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment does not de-
mand consistency at a cost of fewer reprieves from the death penalty.
The explanation for eighth amendment regulation instead lies in recog-
nizing that not every capital murderer "justly deserves" the death pen-
alty. The authors' unexamined assumption to the contrary makes
unnecessarily difficult the explanation of why and how the eighth amend-
ment should control capital sentencing.
145. See Polsby, supra note 26, at 27. Cf. Kalven, supra note 137, at 23 ("The stan-
dards challenged [in McGautha] contained a paradox. The state could meet the due pro-
cess objection by being less merciful. That is, it could eliminate jury discretion and make
death mandatory for a given class of offenses.").
146. Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 413.
147. There are alternatives to the mandatory method already mentioned. Professor
Zeisel describes an informal effort by Florida prosecutors to employ affirmative action-
seeking the death sanction for more killers of blacks. See Zeisel, supra note 5, at 465-66.
For an argument that the inconsistency problem could be solved for purposes of equally
protecting potential black murder victims by consciously increasing the number of death
sentences imposed on murderers of blacks, see Kennedy, supra note 8, at 1436-39. For
discussion regarding the moral propriety of this remedy, see Lempert, Capital Punish-




1. Reexamining the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment Promises
The Court's eighth amendment decisions regulating capital sentencing
simply do not support the promise of consistency that the authors have
extracted from them. I do not mean to contend that no basis existed to
think that some members of the Court viewed equality as an objective for
eighth amendment regulation. However, there is a difference between
noting that concerns about inequality have repeatedly surfaced in the
Justices' death sentencing opinions and portraying it as the overriding
problem that the Court has promised to remedy. The authors of Equal
Justice and the Death Penalty convey the latter impression, but the for-
mer is more correct. It is unclear that a majority of the Justices ever
settled on consistency as the goal of eighth amendment regulation. In-
deed, the Court early on reached decisions suggesting that its purpose
was entirely different.
Doubts even existed immediately after Furman that it revealed a con-
sistency command. The problem was the impracticality of that interpre-
tation. It would have forced courts to resolve the degree of consistency
likely to occur under new schemes without the benefit of empirical evi-
dence. A court could only act on hunches in deciding what kind of sys-
tem produced "consistent" results. Further, it was entirely unclear from
any of the three critical opinions in Furman just what variables should
provide the basis for those hunches or for conducting empirical inquiries.
Because of these very kinds of problems, one commentator shortly after
Furman concluded that the decision was more appropriately read as
merely condemning statutes that permitted sentencers unfettered discre-
tion than as mandating equality.1 48 However, surely the most accurate
view was that, beyond its proscription on wholly standardless sentencing
schemes, the meaning of Furman could not be interpreted meaningfully
without further clarification from the Court.1 49
The Court's subsequent interpretations of Furman also do not support
the overriding command of consistency that the authors ascribe to the
case. The authors argue that the opinions underlying Gregg v. Georgia,
in which the Court upheld Georgia's post-Furman statute, revealed a
Court committed to pursuing "consistency." 1 50 However, this conten-
tion simply ignores two other decisions the Court reached that same day:
Woodson v. North Carolina'51 and (Stanislaus) Roberts v. Louisiana.15 2
In those cases, the Court rejected statutes that mandated the death-pen-
alty upon conviction for murder and aggravated murder. 53 Admittedly,
148. See Note, supra note 21, at 1695-96.
149. See Note, supra note 30, at 421 ("The Furman Court... offered no clear explana-
tion, no coherent rationale, and no guidelines for remedy in the future.").
150. See Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 27.
151. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
152. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
153. The Louisiana statute made the death penalty mandatory for any first-degree
murder. That offense was defined as follows:
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for reasons already noted, mandatory death-penalty statutes would not
produce consistent treatment of all those charged with capital crimes."5
Nonetheless, it was not plausible to reject mandatory death penalty stat-
utes, especially for aggravated murders, out of a belief that they pro-
duced less consistency than schemes like Georgia's, which merely
provided some sentencing guidelines. The only sensible justification for
rejecting these mandatory statutes on procedural grounds was that they
excluded "the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors" from
consideration in fixing the punishment at death.I55 Thus, the 1976 cases,
far from supporting the notion that principles of "equality" could explain
the Furman result, cast doubt on that proposition.' 5 6
The Court's decision only two years later in Lockett v. Ohio '57 further
weakened the notion that equality was the overriding objective of capital-
sentencing regulation. In Lockett, the Court addressed an Ohio statute
that mandated the death penalty for certain aggravated murders unless,
after a sentencing hearing, the trial court found one or more of three
mitigating circumstances:
"First degree murder is the killing of a human being:
"(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggra-
vated kidnapping, aggravated rape or armed robbery; or
"(2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill, or to inflict great bodily
harm upon, a fireman or a peace officer who was engaged in the performance of
his lawful duties; or
"(3) Where the offender has a specific intent to kill or toinflict great bodily
harm and has previously been convicted of an unrelated murder or is serving a
life sentence; or
"(4) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harm upon more than one person; [or]
"(5) When the offender has [a] specific intent to commit murder and has been
offered or has received anything of value for committing the murder.
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14.30 (1974).
154. See text supra note 142.
155. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
156. The following year, the Court reiterated the command of Woodson and (Stanis-
laus) Roberts in (Harry) Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977). There, the Court
invalidated a mandatory death sentence imposed under the "peace officer" provision of
the Louisiana statute. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. In the earlier (Stanis-
laus) Roberts case, the defendant had been sentenced to death under the concurrent fel-
ony provision of the statute. In vacating that death sentence, the Court expressly had
rejected all other provisions of the statute, with one exception: the provision regarding a
murder by one already serving a life sentence. See 428 U.S. at 334 n.9. Shortly after the
(Stanislaus) Roberts decision, in Washington v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 906 (1976), the Court
also had vacated a death sentence imposed under the peace officer provision. Nonethe-
less, a grant of certiorari requires only four votes, see, eg., Hamilton v. Texas, - U.S. -
110 S. CL 3262 (1990)(Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay), and
certiorari apparently was granted in (Harry) Roberts based on the votes of the four dis-
senters in the Woodson and (Stanislaus) Roberts decisions. In vacating the death sentence
in (Harry) Roberts, the Court again reserved judgment on the validity of the provision
imposing a mandatory death sentence for an intentional murder by a life-term inmate.
That Court later resolved the validity of that provision in Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66
(1987). See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
157. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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(1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
(2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but
for the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or
strong provocation.
(3) The offense was primarily the product of the offender's psycho-
sis or mental deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to
establish the defense of insanity. 158
The Supreme Court found these inquiries insufficient to allow for consid-
eration of all factors that should bear on the decision whether to impose
death. 59 Writing for a four-Justice plurality, with Justice Marshall con-
curring in the judgment, Chief Justice Burger declared that a capital sen-
tencer must be allowed to give "independent mitigating weight" to "any
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances
of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death."' 6 This rule was essential to protect against a death sen-
tence imposed despite "factors which may call for a less severe pen-
alty."'' Consequently, the Court struck down the Ohio sentencing
statute. Yet, that statute had aimed to promote consistency in the use of
the death penalty. Ohio had limited the capital sanction to certain aggra-
vated murders and had guided the capital sentencer's discretion along
narrow channels. It was not plausible to believe that the death penalty in
Ohio was distributed less "consistently" than under the Georgia scheme
upheld in Gregg. For this very reason, Lockett cast further doubt on the
proposition that evenhandedness was the principal eighth amendment
objective for regulating capital sentencing. 162
158. Id. at 607 (quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.04(b) (1975)).
159. In Lockett's case, for example, there were substantial mitigating factors present
that were not relevant to any of the three narrow inquiries addressed to the sentencer.
Perhaps the most compelling were encompassed by the facts of the crime itself: the killing
had been committed accidentally by someone other than Lockett during the course of a
robbery of a pawnshop for which Lockett was merely the getaway driver. Furthermore,
Lockett had no serious record of criminal activity and was only twenty-one. See 438 U.S.
at 608.
160. Id. at 604.
161. See id. at 606.
162. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)("By encour-
aging defendants in capital cases, and presumably sentencing judges and juries, to take
into consideration anything under the sun as a "mitigating circumstance, "it will not
guide sentencing discretion but will totally unleash it."); id. at 623 (White, J., dissenting)
("This [ruling] invites a return to the pre-Furman days when the death penalty was gen-
erally reserved for those very few for whom society has least consideration."). See also J.
Ely, supra note 26, at 174 (noting that "the Court seemed to opt for maximum discretion
by holding it unconstitutional to exclude from the consideration of the jury [sic] anything
that might plausibly be thought to bear on whether the defendant should be executed");
Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. 305, 325 ("Lockett restores a large part
of the jury discretion that the Court has purported to restrain."); Gillers, Deciding Who
Dies, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1980)("Lockett shifted the inquiry from the avoidance of
arbitrariness to what may be considered its opposite, the recognition of "uniqueness.");
Hertz & Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death: Lockett v. Ohio and the Capital
Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 317,
374-76 (198 1)(arguing that Lockett reinforced the view already revealed in the 1976 cases
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The Court's post-Lockett decisions rationalizing the approval of stat-
utes like Georgia's also cast doubt on the proposition that the Court truly
believed that they produced consistency. In Zant v. Stephens,'63 the
Court largely rewrote the rhetoric about consistency in Justice Stewart's
Gregg opinion. The Stephens Court abandoned the notion proffered by
Justice Stewart in Gregg that the Georgia statute "guided" capital-
sentencing discretion. Now the Court upheld the Georgia statute while
conceding that the Georgia sentencer's discretion, once narrowed, re-
mained entirely "unbridled.""' Furthermore, Justice Stewart's Gregg
opinion had touted the Georgia scheme for its inclusion of comparative
proportionality review of death sentences by the Georgia Supreme
Court.1 65 However, Professor Dix soon demonstrated that the Georgia
court was not meaningfully carrying out this mandate. '66 The Supreme
Court could have reevaluated the Georgia court's efforts in that regard.
Instead, in Pulley v. Harris,167 the Court simply abandoned the notion
that comparative proportionality review was constitutionally required.
68
What objective other than consistency do the Court's post-Furman
cases reveal about its eighth amendment regulatory efforts? In fact, the
Court has not consistently pursued any coherent objective. The Court's
aims in this area have always appeared uncertain, confused, or con-
flicted.' 69 However, there are points to be extracted from its decisions
that are helpful in judging the perspective of the authors of this study.
that the eighth amendment does not require guided discretion in the decision to reprieve
an offender from death).
163. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
164. Id. at 875.
165. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
166. See Dix, supra note 87, at 110-23. The authors of the Baldus Study contend that
comparative proportionality review by a statewide appellate court is an essential compo-
nent of any meaningful effort to ensure consistency in a capital selection process. See,
e.g., Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 409-10 ("if we have learned anything from our re-
search, it is that fairness and consistency in capital sentencing is only possible with some
effective system of posttrial oversight and review").
167. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
168. The Court in Harris was addressing the absence of comparative proportionality
review in the California statute. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 40-41 (1984). While
the Court suggested that comparative proportionality review might be required if a sys-
tem did not provide alternative checks on arbitrariness, there appeared to be no meaning-
ful alternative checks operating in the California system. See id. at 51. The California
statute was the same in all important respects as the Georgia system upheld in Gregg.
Consequently, the Harris decision strongly implied that the Georgia system was not inva-
lid even if the Georgia Supreme Court was conducting no effective comparative propor-
tionality review. The authors agree with this interpretation of Harris though they view it
as apostasy. See Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 406 ("In an apparent retreat from sev-
eral of its earlier pronouncements, the Court held in Pulley that the eighth amendment
did not require state courts to conduct proportionality reviews, even in states with broad
levels of jury discretion."); id at 280 ("Pulley v. Harris ... ruled that a system of propor-
tionality review is not constitutionally required.").
169. See Note, supra note 30, at 417-18 (describing the Court's modern capital sentenc-
ing jurisprudence as "a confusing array of ill-defined concepts, conflicting pronounce-
ments, ipse dixits, and short-lived precedents").
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First, contrary to the authors' interpretation, several of the Court's capi-
tal-sentencing opinions reject the view that it is concerned primarily with
ensuring consistency,170 and no decision truly supports that proposi-
tion."'1 At the same time, the Court has rejected the assumption that
underlies the authors' view that the Furman decision must rest on the
need to ensure consistency: that the "just deserts" under the eighth
amendment of those convicted of capital crimes are death sentences. 7
2
The Court repeatedly has invalidated statutes mandating the death pen-
alty upon conviction even for highly aggravated homicides. 73 Most re-
cently, it invalidated a statute that required death upon conviction for
intentional murder by a person already serving a life sentence. 174 Like-
wise, it repeatedly has rejected even statutory schemes that merely limit
the sentencer's ability to consider evidence about the offender or his
crime for what it says about the offender's deserts. 75 Most recently, in
Penry v. Lynaugh,1 76 the Court struck down the application of the Texas
statute because the three factors that it provided to guide the sentencer 77
170. In addition to the decisions discussed earlier, see Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939
(1983). There the Court reached a conclusion in the context of the Florida system that
corresponded with its decision in Stephens. Barclay reinforced the conclusion that a stat-
utory aggravating circumstance need not actually "guide" or "channel" sentencer discre-
tion. See id. at 950. Cf Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988)(declaring that the
capital sentencer need not be guided by any standards as long as an aggravating circum-
stance is incorporated into the definition of the murder offense).
171. Elsewhere, I have described another view of capital sentencing regulation embod-
ied in current doctrine as the "non-arbitrariness" theory. See Howe, supra note 25, at -
(forthcoming). This view is different than the "consistency" theory advocated by the
authors in that it assumes that any system that confines sentencer choice at all will satisfy
the eighth amendment. I have argued that this view of the function of capital sentencing
regulation is illogical. See id. at -
172. The authors note the decisions in Zant v. Stephens and Pulley v. Harris. However,
they portray them as the first suggestions "that the Court was becoming less committed
to special safeguards to ensure reliability and, ultimately, consistency." Equal Justice,
supra note 15, at 406. The authors do not ever intimate that the Woodson/Lockett line of
cases cast doubt on their view that consistency was the singular objective of eighth
amendment regulation. They do not acknowledge that those decisions undermined the
foundational assumption that forces their interpretation of Furman and Gregg as resting
on equality principles. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
173. In addition to the Woodson and (Stanislaus) Roberts decisions, see supra note 156.
174. See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987).
175. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982); Hitchcock v. Dugger,
481 U.S. 383 (1987). For a case that goes beyond requiring the sentencer to consider
evidence about the offender for what it says about his deserts, which the author criticizes,
see Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986)(holding that the sentencer must be free
to consider evidence of the offender's previous good behavior in jail for what it says about
his "future dangerousness," a utilitarian concern).
176. 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
177. Those questions read as follows:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the de-
ceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the
death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing
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did not allow consideration of all evidence bearing on Penry's culpabil-
ity.17 8 These decisions provide a strong hint as to the proper objective
for regulating capital sentencing under the eighth amendment.
2. What the Eighth Amendment Requires: A Limitation on Death
Sentences Based on Offender Deserts
The overriding aim of regulating capital sentencing under the eighth
amendment is to ensure that only murderers who deserve death sentences
receive them-not to ensure consistent treatment of all capital offend-
ers. 7 9 This alternative view has much to commend it. Unlike the con-
sistency theory, this view builds on an accepted, traditional
interpretation of the eighth amendment as proscribing "excessive" pun-
ishments. Likewise, this view is the only one available that can justify a
ban on mandatory death sentences by explaining the need in all capital
cases for a sentencing inquiry. It also is the only one that can easily
explain why we focus regulation on the sentencer alone rather than on all
the decision makers in the capital selection process, including prosecu-
tors and appellate courts. Thus, at the same time that this theory is
grounded in established eighth amendment doctrine, it comes closest to
explaining the fundamental features of existing eighth amendment regu-
lation. Finally, unlike the "consistency" theory, this alternative theory
provides independent regulatory functions for the eighth and fourteenth
amendments.
The explanation for this alternative view starts with the proposition
that the authors implicitly concede: that the eighth amendment limits the
use of the death penalty to those who "just[ly] deser[ve]" it."&° That
proposition embodies two assumptions. First, it assumes that the eighth
amendment does more than merely proscribe punishments deemed bar-
baric in an absolute sense. The eighth amendment must also measure
punishments in proportional terms. Thus, death sentences may be justi-
fied sometimes, but not always. Likewise, it assumes that the proper
measure of proportionality in the death-penalty context is rooted purely
in retributive ideals. This means that the provision aims to ensure that
the offender receives no more punishment than he "deserves," despite
any utilitarian benefits of punishing him more severely.1 81
the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071 (West 1979)(supp. 1991).
178. Penry had urged, in arguing for mitigation of his sentence, evidence of his mental
retardation, brain damage, and abused background. See Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2941-42.
This evidence tended to suggest reduced moral culpability for the crime but enhanced
future dangerousness. Under the Texas statute, see supra note 177, the evidence could
have been considered against him on the second special question bearing on future dan-
gerousness, but could not have been considered in his favor.
179. I have elaborated on this point elsewhere. See Howe, supra note 25, at
180. Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 417.
181. The "retributive theory" of punishment, in its most general form, means that a
punishment is warranted because the offender deserves it, apart from any utilitarian bene-
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Both assumptions find support in existing interpretations of the eighth
amendment. As early as 1910, in Weems v. United States, 1 2 the
Supreme Court recognized that the eighth amendment embodies a pro-
tection against punishments that are excessive in their application even
though they are not proscribed per se.18 3 Moreover, in the capital con-
text, though not for non-capital crimes, the Court has indicated that the
measure of excessiveness is rooted in retributive ideals. In Coker v. Geor-
gia," 4 the Court held that death was categorically excessive punishment
for rape.18 - Justice White, for a four-Justice plurality,1"6 began by dem-
onstrating that the death penalty for rape was not widely employed. Yet,
ultimately, he acknowledged that the issue was one on which the Justices
had to exercise their "own judgment."" 7 The decisive point was that the
interests invaded by rape simply were not equal to the interests in life
itself. This rationale implied that death was categorically excessive pun-
ishment for virtually all crimes that did not involve "the taking of human
life."1 88 Because Justice White also did not discuss the utilitarian justifi-
cations for imposing the death penalty in these cases, the retributive basis
for the conclusion was clear.189 Moreover, while the Court's subsequent
applications of the Coker doctrine have been predicated on determining
that the death penalty is not widely used in a given circumstance, the
fits that it produces. See generally N. Walker, Punishment, Danger and Stigma: The
Morality of Criminal Justice 38-40 (1980).
182. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
183. Weems, a public official, had been convicted under Philippine law for a small theft
as a public official. He was sentenced to cadena temporal, which involved at least twelve
years and a day at hard labor in chains, the loss of all civil rights, and perpetual parole.
Writing for the Court, Justice McKenna referred not only to the severe and unusual
character of the accessory punishments, but to the "excess of imprisonment" involved.
Id. at 377. Other statements in the opinion implied that the Court was declaring the
punishment impermissible for Weems' particular offense, but not impermissible in all cir-
cumstances: "Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who.., believe that it is a
precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to
offense." Id. at 366-67.
Seven members of the Supreme Court recently endorsed the view that Weems properly
laid down an eighth amendment protection against excessive punishments. See Harmelin
v. Michigan, - U.S. _, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991). Some have questioned whether the
Weems decision rested on the conclusion that the punishment imposed there was exces-
sive or simply outlawed as a matter of mode, see, e.g., Packer, Making the Punishment Fit
The Crime, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1071, 1074-76 (1964)(arguing that the decision may only
have proscribed the mode of punishment imposed), and have rejected the notion that the
eighth amendment articulates a protection against excessiveness. See Harmelin v. Michi-
gan, - U.S. _, 111 S. Ct. at 2684-2701 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
184. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
185. See id. at 592, 599.
186. Justices Marshall and Brennan each separately concurred in the judgment on
grounds that the death penalty violated the eighth amendment in all circumstances. See
id. at 600. Justice Powell also concurred in the judgment on grounds that, given the
particular facts of Coker's crime, the death penalty was excessive punishment. See id. at
601 (Powell, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 597.
188. Id. at 598.
189. See J. Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law 39-40 (1987).
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ultimate proportionality judgment also appears to rest on a retributive
measure.
190
This protection against punitive excess can explain why capital-sen-
tencing regulation under the eighth amendment should focus on ensuring
a judgment about whether the offender deserves the death penalty.
First, the Court need only recognize that no matter how narrow and
aggravated the capital offense, not every offender who falls within the
category can be said to "deserve" death. Deserts cannot be clarified by
the kind of objective standards that are incorporated into the definition of
crimes. We cannot fairly judge deserts without considering the factual
particularities of both the offense and the offender. Precisely what level
of involvement did the offender have in the crime? To what extent was
the crime attributable to others? What was the offender's mental state at
the time? Was he retarded, emotionally disturbed, or under the influence
of drugs? Further, we might also ask, in resolving his deserts on a more
general level, what other good or bad deeds has the offender committed
in his life and what do they suggest about his character? The conclusion
that one is guilty, even of aggravated murder, does not by itself reveal his
level of culpability for the crime or define the broader measure of his life
that we might call his "moral merit."
This theory of regulation is also the only one that can justify certain
fundamental attributes of existing capital-sentencing doctrine. First, as
we saw, the "equality" or "consistency" paradigm cannot adequately ex-
plain a per se prohibition on statutes mandating the death penalty upon
conviction for a capital offense; mandatory death sentences, combined
with restricted prosecutorial discretion to reprieve offenders, could rea-
sonably be thought to promote consistent treatment of capital offend-
ers. 19 1 However, the theory based on notions of excessiveness outlaws
mandatory or even overly restrictive sentencing approaches because it
assumes that a broad sentencing inquiry must always precede a judgment
that an offender "deserves" the death penalty. It rejects the assumption
that forces the debate into the difficult arena of attempting to accommo-
date two conflicting objectives: consistency and the provision for mercy.
Under this alternative view, the very function of the sentencing hearing is
to resolve the foundational question regarding the "just deserts" of the
capital offender.
Also, principles of punitive excess, unlike the consistency theory, can
easily explain regulatory efforts focused exclusively on the sentencing de-
cision. The goal of "consistency" in sentencing decisions seems only to
make sense as an effort to produce an equitable distribution of death
190. See, eg., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)(stating that the criminal
sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the offender); Penry v.
Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2955-58 (1989) (O'Connor, J. concurring)(concluding that the
proportionality requires a connection between the punishment and the defendant's
culpability).
191. See discussion supra note 142.
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sentences among all those who have committed capital crimes. However,
if anything is clear about the administration of the death penalty, it is
that most death-eligible offenders escape the death penalty through dis-
cretionary decisions made outside the sentencing proceeding.192 In
Georgia, for example, prosecutors have unfettered discretion to charge or
plea-bargain capital cases in a way that will reprieve death-eligible of-
fenders. 193 Prosecutors also have unfettered discretion over whether to
abandon pursuit of the death penalty for those convicted of capital
crimes.' 94 The Georgia executive branch also has unfettered discretion
to extend executive clemency to those under death sentences.' 95 Conse-
quently, even if Georgia imposed sentencing standards that actually
channeled or guided the sentencer's decision-which it has not-the line
separating capital offenders who received death sentences from those
who were spared would continue to defy rational explanation; indeed,
commentators have argued that decreasing sentencer discretion to extend
reprieves may increase the number of standardless reprieves extended at
the non-sentencing stages.' 96 The "consistency" theory cannot then pro-
vide an easy explanation for focusing regulations exclusively on the sen-
tencer. By contrast, the punitive excess view is not undermined by a
failure to regulate these non-sentencing stages because it does not claim
to strive for the kind of consistency advocated by the authors. Ensuring
that death sentences are only imposed on the deserving does not demand
that all who deserve death sentences receive them.
Finally, the view that the eighth amendment protects against punitive
excess provides independent roles for the eighth and the fourteenth
amendments. The consistency view simply assumes that the eighth
amendment shares the fourteenth amendment's function, rendering the
eighth amendment's regulatory role "superfluous." '  Of course, cor-
rectly analyzing the legitimate source in the Constitution of equality de-
192. Shortly after Furman, commentators noted that this would be the reality of even
the new statutes. See, e.g., Note, supra note 21, at 1712-13 (stating that the new statutes
do not eliminate the arbitrariness of sentencing, but just alter the stages in the criminal
process in which arbitrariness can arise). In his opinion supporting Gregg, Justice White
cast doubt on whether this would be true, arguing that prosecutors would generally pur-
sue the death penalty in any case in which they thought they could obtain it. See Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 225-26 (White, J., concurring). This view was facially implausi-
ble, however, and the Baldus study demonstrates that the vast majority of death-eligible
offenders in Georgia are spared other than through the decision of sentencing juries. See,
e.g., Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 232-34. For example, among other points of "leak-
age," in more than two-thirds of the cases in which a capital conviction obtains, the
prosecutor nonetheless declines to pursue the death penalty. Id. at 327.
193. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199.
194. See Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 106, 327.
195. See, e.g., Bentele, supra note 5, at 621-38 (describing clemency structure in
Georgia).
196. See, e.g., Note, supra note 21, at 1714-16 (stating that impulses to exercise discre-
tion promoting leniency in capital cases become stronger when discretion in the sentenc-
ing stage has been restricted).
197. See Polsby, supra note 26, at 27.
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mands does not help clarify how to enhance equality in the distribution
of capital sentences. That question, while difficult, is unavoidable if soci-
ety does not respond to the inevitability of some inequality by abolishing
the death penalty.19 However, my point here is that by recognizing that
this equality goal builds on the fourteenth amendment, we clarify that
the eighth amendment must regulate capital sentencing, if at all, based on
some independent objective. That conclusion, in turn, demands that we
not obscure the true basis for assessing the Court's efforts to regulate
capital sentencing under the eighth amendment by asking only whether it
has pursued equality.
III. PURSUING JUST DEATH SENTENCES AS AN EIGHTH
AMENDMENT OBJECTIVE
Has the Court fulfilled the eighth amendment objective of limiting cap-
ital sentences according to retributive ideals? Evaluating the Court's ef-
forts from this perspective can be separated into two inquiries. First, has
the Court sought to ensure that capital sentencers only impose the death
sentence on those deemed to deserve it? Secondly, has the Court sought
to ensure that sentencer assessments of offender deserts are sufficiently
accurate to vindicate the protection?' 99 The answer to the first issue is
no, which highlights the central logical flaw in the Court's eighth amend-
ment regulation of capital sentencing. However, the answer to the sec-
ond question also is no, which underscores the need for certain special
protections to ensure reasonable accuracy in the assessment of offender
deserts.
A. Evaluating the Court's Efforts to Ensure Sentencer Judgments
About Offender Deserts
The true eighth amendment problem with a statute like Georgia's is
not difficult to detect. As we already have seen, the justification for a
separate sentencing inquiry in every capital case builds on the broad, sub-
jective nature of the desired desert assessment. We cannot adequately
incorporate all the various facets of offender deserts in the definition of
an offense. E°" Of course, we must resolve the level(s) of generality at
which the desert inquiry should proceed. I have argued elsewhere that
we should ask the capital sentencer two questions.2"' The first should
call for a broad evaluation of the offender's "culpability" for the capital
crime alone,2 "2 and the second should aim to produce an assessment of
198. See discussion and authorities cited supra notes 136-44.
199. Cf. Gillers, The Quality of Mercy: Constitutional Accuracy at the Selection Stage of
Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1037 (1985)(urging three procedural compo-
nents as essential to accurate capital sentencing judgments of offender deserts).
200. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
201. See Howe, supra note 25, at
202. In the criminal law, "culpability" has a different meaning for sentencing purposes
than for purposes of deciding guilt or innocence. As Professor Wise has explained:
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his "moral merit" based on all of his life works. The offender should be
found deserving of the death penalty under both inquiries to receive that
punishment, though states could also impose additional inquiries as pre-
requisites to a death sentence. These also are the kinds of general inquir-
ies that the Court has suggested should control the capital sentencer's
decision.20 3
Statutes like Georgia's2  simply do not require that these kinds of de-
sert judgments precede a death sentence. The jury's determination that
one or more of the aggravating circumstances listed in the statute are
present does not satisfy this need. Several of the aggravating factors in
the statute arguably serve utilitarian more than retributive ends. For ex-
ample, one who kills during the commission of a serious felony does not
automatically deserve the death penalty more than other murderers who
are not death-eligible such as one who kills his spouse to pursue his par-
amour. The argument for distinguishing these two situations is only that
the death penalty may be a more effective deterrent to murder for those
engaged in crimes for which they already are subject to long prison
terms. Further, while some of the statutory circumstances may bear on
offender deserts, they comprise only a few of a multitude of factors re-
quiring consideration. For example, we cannot say, without considering
a defendant's volitional capacity at the time of the offense, that because a
The range of relevant factors is greater. To find an offender guilty, it ordina-
rily is sufficient to conclude that he acted with a certain intent or awareness and
without any grossly debilitating impairment of capacity for self-control. In as-
sessing the punishment he deserves, it usually is considered important not only
to pay closer attention to different levels of awareness and organic capacity, but
also to take account of a variety of factors-underlying motives, desires, atti-
tudes, dispositions, impulses, pressures, and temptations-which generally are
disregarded where the issue is one of culpability vel non.
Wise, The Concept of Desert, 33 Wayne L. Rev. 1343, 1352-53 (1987). I also am using
"culpability" in a way that can account for any differences in the harm produced by the
offender. See id. at 1352.
203. The required finding of sufficient "culpability" builds on two sources: first, decla-
rations from the Court about the centrality of "culpability" judgments to the capital sen-
tencing decision, see, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2947 (1989); second, the
Court's ruling in Coker v. Georgia that the defendant's prior record, which included a
capital murder, did not affect the conclusion that death was an excessive punishment for
rape, see Coker, 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977). The required finding of sufficient "moral
merit" builds on the ruling in Lockett and its progeny that any evidence bearing on the
offender's background or character, regardless of whether it relates to his culpability, is
relevant to the sentencer's inquiry. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)(capital
sentencer must be allowed to reject the death penalty based on "any aspect of a defend-
ant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death"). See also Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481
U.S. 393, 397 (1987)(requiring that sentencer be allowed to reject the death penalty based
on mitigating factors such as, the offender was "one of seven children... earned... [his]
living by picking cotton.., that his father had died of cancer and.., that [he] had been a
fond and affectionate uncle." Cf. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885-86 (indicating that
prosecutor may introduce evidence of defendant's prior record at the sentencing hearing).
204. See supra note 34.
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killing was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman"2 ° the
offender deserves the death penalty.
A Georgia jury's authority to exercise unfettered discretion after find-
ing one or more of the aggravating circumstances also does not ensure
that the jury will judge the offender's deserts before imposing a death
sentence. The jury can find that the offender does not deserve death-
perhaps because he is retarded or mentally ill or was inebriated when the
crime occurred-but still impose a death sentence to incapacitate an ap-
parently dangerous offender or to deter other potential murderers. The
jury can employ any standard that it chooses at this ultimate stage of
decisionmaking.
There is also reason to doubt that sentencers usually employ desert
standards at this final discretionary stage although that might be their
natural tendency. Even for sentencers who approach their task with this
"usual" perspective, the aggravating circumstances themselves tend to
influence sentencer judgments,' °e which distorts the results, particularly
if those factors are not entirely desert-oriented. Distortion also arises
because prosecutors are not bound to argue within desert parameters.
Especially where the offender's deserts are low, the prosecutor is likely to
pitch the issue in some other direction. Given the unbounded nature of
the sentencing inquiry that the Court approved in Gregg, lower courts
have frequently declined to prevent prosecutors from arguing utilitarian
justifications for the capital sanction. 07
If the goal of the sentencing inquiry is to ensure that a judgment of
deserts precedes any death sentence, it makes sense to tell the jurors. We
need not conduct an empirical investigation to see that the Georgia sys-
tem is flawed. Yet, one aspect of the authors' empirical efforts bears out
the problem at the same time that it undermines their efforts to measure
"consistency" according to a desert measure. One of their methods for
defining deserts2  was empirical: they used statistical techniques to iden-
tify case characteristics that correlated with jurors' actual sentencing de-
205. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 865 n.I (quoting Ga. Code Ann. § 27-
2534.1(b)(7) (Supp. 1975)).
206. See Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 596 app. J.
207. See, e.g., Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1411-12 (11th Cir. 1985) (authorizing
arguments for the death penalty on incapacitation grounds); Collins v. Francis, 728 F.2d
1322, 1340-41 (1I1th Cir. 1984) (authorizing prosecutors to argue for the death penalty on
general deterrence grounds); Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113, 303 S.E. 2d 266 (1983) (au-
thorizing incapacitation argument for death penalty).
208. The authors declare that they are measuring "culpability." It is apparent, how-
ever, that they are not focusing solely on the offender's blameworthiness or level of re-
sponsibility for the capital crime, though they imply the contrary. See Equal Justice,
supra note 15, at 68 n. 16. For example, they deem it appropriate in measuring "culpabil-
ity" to consider the offender's prior record. This suggests that they are really speaking of
what we might call the offender's "moral merit." See supra note 202 and accompanying
text. There is no satisfactory explanation for how prior convictions bear upon an of-
fender's "blameworthiness" or "personal responsibility" for a new crime.
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cisions and then excluded the features they deemed illegitimate.2 "9 But
there were problems with this effort. First, some of the factors that were
weeded out were not inherently "illegitimate" even if they did not appear
to relate to deserts.21° Moreover, the factors and weights that the au-
thors found proper implied a very questionable notion of deserts. For
example, the analysis revealed that if an offender was in the military, he
was eight times more likely to receive a death sentence than a civilian, all
other factors held constant.211  Similarly, the authors accept that the
odds that the defendant would receive the death penalty should be 38.36
times greater if he had an insurance-proceeds motive than if he did not,
while the odds that a defendant would receive a death sentence should be
only 8.73 times higher if the killing was especially gruesome or
"bloody." 212 Furthermore, the authors deem it appropriate to consider
the odds of a death sentence 3.14 times higher if the offender had a prior
conviction for a serious crime of violence such as murder, armed rob-
bery, or rape. One might conclude that all of these various differences
are explained more easily on utilitarian or other rationales than on com-
mon notions of desert. Indeed, all of these problems hint at a fairly ma-
jor flaw with the authors' empirical efforts to define deserts: there is no
reason to think that jurors are relying solely or even substantially on
deserts to decide when to impose the death penalty.213
209. The measures and their respective weights are reported in tables, see Equal Jus-
tice, supra note 15, at 587-601 app. J, both before and after the excision of "illegiti-
mates." See id. at 56-57 (explaining the meaning of the tables).
210. For example, the analysis indicated that cooperation by the defendant with the
authorities, even after efforts to control all other pertinent factors, tended to increase, by
sixteen times, the chances of a death sentence. See id. at 596-97. The authors concluded
that this was a perverse characteristic and excluded it from the prediction model. See id.
at 193 n. 44. Likewise, if there were one or more "minor aggravating circumstances"
present, the chances of a death sentence significantly decreased compared to the case in
which there were no such aggravating circumstances. See id. at 596-97. Finding this
effect perverse, the authors also excluded it. See id.
211. See id. at 597.
212. See id.
213. The authors' other empirical method for defining deserts, which they call "culpa-
bility," also presents a highly distorted perspective of deserts. One of the three major
factors found to greatly influence the likelihood of a death sentence, according to Profes-
sor Barnett, was whether the victim was a stranger to or an acquaintance of the defend-
ant. If the victim was a stranger, the defendant was much more likely to receive the
death sentence. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. It is unclear, however, why
this factor should be thought to bear on the offender's deserts. Instead, it may suggest the
extent to which jurors see the defendant as a threat to people like themselves, since,
though they can largely control with whom they associate, they have much less control
over being attacked by a stranger. This basis for judging the defendant builds on a utilita-
rian notion.
The authors also employ "a priori" measures of "culpability." One model, used to
compare armed-robbery murder cases, rested on their own intuitions about what factors
legitimately ought to bear on the sentencing decision. However, it is impossible to judge
the validity of that model since the authors do not explain it in sufficient detail. See
Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 49. The other involved measuring the number of statu-
tory aggravating circumstances present in a case. However, the textual discussion, supra
notes 204-07, demonstrates the flaws in this approach to measuring culpability.
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Allowing the sentencer to rely on utilitarian rationales for death
sentences not only abandons the notion that the eighth amendment seeks
to protect the undeserving from the death penalty,2"4 but, it also conflicts
with the prohibition in existing doctrine on mandatory death sentences.
While it is impossible to measure deserts according to objective rules that
can be incorporated into the definition of the crime, that is not true of
utilitarian measures. A legislature could rationally conclude that execut-
ing all aggravated murderers defined according to certain objective stan-
dards provides optimal societal benefits, including the greatest reduction
in serious crimes.2"5 The only way for the Court to reject this conclu-
sion, other than by simply rejecting utilitarianism, would be to fashion its
own measure of optimal utility. There would be no reason to ask
sentencers where the line should be drawn in individual cases, since that
question does not turn on the facts and circumstances of each case. Con-
sequently, assuming utilitarian justifications were appropriate, the Court
could not easily justify a decision to reject the legislature's choices. This
conclusion reconfirms that ensuring that a desert judgment precedes a
death sentence must be the function of the mandated capital sentencing
hearing.
In the end, then, it is the ability of Georgia jurors to impose the death
penalty on utilitarian (or concededly improper) rationales, rather than
their ability to act arbitrarily toward offenders who deserve death, that
demonstrates why the Georgia system betrays eighth amendment val-
ues.2"6 It is hardly enough that the Georgia system allows capital
214. The problems with this kind of system can be highlighted by considering the case
of a retarded or mentally impaired offender. Though the malady may be seen as render-
ing the offender less deserving of death, execution still may be justified as deterring other
potential murderers or as incapacitating the defendant. The defendant's malady may
even be viewed as enhancing his likely future dangerousness since it could be thought
likely to persist. Consequently, powerful mitigating evidence from a desert perspective
becomes irrelevant, or worse, aggravating, when utilitarian objectives are pursued.
215. This point remains true even though some utilitarian measures, such as the de-
fendant's future dangerousness, require individualized consideration. A legislature could
rationally conclude that utilitarian benefits like crime reduction and cost savings that
arise from a mandatory death penalty outweigh the benefits of sparing defendants deemed
not to present great risks of future violence. While it is possible to understand why the
eighth amendment would limit the use of the death penalty to those deemed deserving
after individualized inquiry, there is no basis under the eighth amendment for allowing a
legislature to pursue one utilitarian objective but not another.
216. The authors at one point appear to contradict themselves about the penological
rationales that they believe capital sentencers should apply. They build the PRS on the
assumption that "culpability" defines the normative standard for judging capital sentenc-
ing cases. However, one of their criticisms of the Georgia system in their conclusion
contradicts this normative assumption:
Finally, the statutory guidelines and the typical jury instructions are also defi-
cient in another respect: they make no reference to the goals of retribution or
deterrence that the sentencing decision is supposed to implement. Such gui-
dance would at a minimum ensure that different juries would approach the sen-
tencing decision from a somewhat similar perspective when deciding how to
evaluate the circumstances of particular cases.
Equal Justice, supra note 15, at 410 (emphasis added).
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sentencers to render desert judgments whenever they happen not to have
been misled by the aggravating factors or by the arguments of the law-
yers. The only eighth amendment theory that can coherently explain
why we should allow sentencers to render desert assessments is one that
logically demands such judgments before the imposition of a death sen-
tence. The Court's failure to require systems to conform to that objective
describes the overriding flaw in its eighth amendment decisions regulat-
ing capital sentencing.2 17
B. The Eighth Amendment Quest For Accuracy
Efforts to regulate capital sentencing assessments raise a second set of
eighth amendment problems that implicate concerns about arbitrariness
and discrimination. Ensuring that only offenders who deserve the death
penalty receive that sanction demands reasonable accuracy in desert de-
terminations. However, given the subjectivity of the desert inquiries,
there is reason to question just how consistent the judgments would be.
These problems raise questions about whether capital punishment should
be invalidated altogether under the eighth amendment; at the very least,
they augur for special protections to attempt to vindicate the central
eighth amendment objective of ensuring that only the deserving receive
the death penalty.
An overriding obstacle to producing accurate judgments about of-
fender deserts stems from the sentencer's inability to resolve certain es-
sential factual issues. First, we do not know enough about the
functioning of the human mind to trace the root causes of a murderous
act. We know little even about how diagnosable brain disorders or psy-
chiatric syndromes actually influence decisions to kill.21 Moreover, we
have very little understanding about what specific influences in an of-
fender's environment that were beyond his control have affected his
mental functioning. We also do not know how to weigh the more general
claim that "slums or poverty or oppression of minority groups" contrib-
217. The Court has repeatedly upheld other systems that fail, like Georgia's, to require
the capital sentencer to render judgments about whether the offender deserves death as a
precondition to imposing the death penalty. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, - U.S. -, 110
S. Ct. 3047, 3056 (1990)("[t]he requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases
is satisfied by allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence"); Blystone v.
Pennsylvania, - U.S. _ 110 S. Ct. 1078, 1083-84 (1990)(same); Boyde v. California, -
U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 1190, 1196 (1990)(same); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246
(1988)(same); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258 (1976)(the requirements of Furman
are satisfied when the sentencing authority's discretion is guided and channeled by requir-
ing examination of specific factors that argue in favor of or against imposition of the
death penalty, thus eliminating total arbitrariness and capriciousness in its imposition).
Moreover, because virtually every capital-sentencing statute in the country is patterned
on the statutes upheld in 1976, the problems that apply to the Georgia statute apply
widely throughout the country. However, for a statute that appears to satisfy the eighth
amendment, see 1952 Conn. Penal Code § 53a-46a(d).




ute to violent conduct.219 Further, even if we could identify the correct
answers to these kinds of questions, no system exists for resolving which
explanations or combinations thereof should suffice to relieve the mur-
derer of "deserving" death. The determination becomes even more com-
plex when one must factor in a lifetime of good and bad acts and the
myriad of other aggravating and mitigating circumstances concerning
the offender's crime.2 2 ' Nor can sentencers know how death by execu-
tion compares to life imprisonment in terms of the severity of the suffer-
ing produced. Even if a general consensus existed about the level of
retribution associated with a life prison term, sentencers cannot know
what will come after death. This kind of comparative evaluation is made
all the more impossible by the jury's inability to assess the varying retrib-
utive effects of these sanctions on individual offenders. What may bring
severe hardship to one offender may impose little suffering on another.
Because we cannot fathom the "correct" answers to these various kinds
of questions, sentencers' views on them will simply reflect individual
guesses and may vary widely. Consequently, capital-sentencing decisions
may hinge far more on the particular perspectives of the sentencer than
on the particularities of the offender's background and crime.
We also should ask whether sentencer judgments about offender
deserts inevitably will be distorted by improper influences. For example,
sentencers may be swayed inappropriately toward imposing a death sen-
tence by their perceptions that an offender poses a future danger to cor-
rectional workers or the general public. This concern about the
incapacitating effects of the alternative sanction may cause sentencers to
favor the death penalty even for an offender they would not otherwise
judge to deserve death. That problem may be most acute where
prosecutorial argument subtly or explicitly emphasizes the dangerous-
ness of the offender.
In any state not providing the sentencer with the alternative penalty of
life without possibility of parole, sentencers may also impose execution
primarily to avoid the possibility that parole authorities will fail to ensure
a sufficiently retributive sanction."2 To tell the sentencer of the possibil-
ity of parole from a life prison term surely invites sentencers to act on
their fears that the offender may be inappropriately set free. Instructing
219. Id. at 183 (arguing that these are not significant causes of crime). But see Good-
paster, The Trial For Life: Effective Assistance In Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
299, 335 (1983)(arguing that the defense in a capital case should "attempt to show that
the defendant's capital crimes are humanly understandable in light of his past history and
the unique circumstances affecting his formative development.").
220. The notion that it is impossible accurately to proportion punishment to crime is
not novel. The Italian criminologist, Raffaele Garofalo (1852-1934), spurned the idea
decades ago: "There are too many elements to be taken into consideration. We have to
deal with the gravity of the material harm, that of the intrinsic immortality of the act,
that of the danger, and finally, that of the alarm." Wise, supra note 202, at 1360 (quoting
Garofalo).
221. See generally Gillers, supra note 199, at 1107-10 (jury's knowledge of review pro-
cedures may over-influence its imposition of the death penalty).
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the sentencer not to consider the possibility of parole in reaching its deci-
sion also arguably provides insufficient protection.222 It highlights the
existence of release options and thereby invites sentencers to act on mis-
perceptions that the offender will be eligible promptly for release.223
In reaching broad desert judgments, sentencers also may subcon-
sciously consider inappropriate factors such as the race, ethnic back-
ground, state of residence, and sexual preference of the defendant and the
victim. None of these factors bear on an offender's moral guilt for the
capital crime or on his general moral worth. Of course, we cannot pre-
dict what effect these influences would have based on empirical studies of
existing capital sentencing systems. Unless the system under investiga-
tion limited the sentencer to assessing deserts-which no current system
does-it would be impossible to distinguish discrimination in the sen-
tencing of those deemed deserving of the death penalty (arising from the
sentencer's authority to extend mercy, for example) from inconsistency
in the application of the desert standard itself. The difficulty is that we
cannot define a priori what level of deserts warrants the death penalty or
how to decide when that level of deserts has been established. Nonethe-
less, despite the impossibility of empirical proof, it surely is realistic to
believe that many capital sentencers would be influenced by inappropri-
ate factors. Indeed, some respected lawyers have argued that improper
considerations would always predominate in determining who would be
executed, regardless of the sentencing standards promulgated by the
legislature.224
Despite these various problems with obtaining meaningful desert judg-
ments, serious obstacles confront any claim that the protection against
cruel and unusual punishment outlaws capital punishment altogether.
The language of the fifth amendment reveals that the framers did not
foresee that the Constitution would proscribe capital punishment in all
circumstances.225 The language of the fourteenth amendment suggests
222. The Supreme Court has recognized the reality that jurors in some instances may
not be able to ignore certain evidence so that to merely instruct them to do so is an
insufficient protection. See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)(invalidating New
York procedure in which jurors were allowed to determine whether a confession was
"involuntary" and told to ignore any such confession).
223. One study revealed a common misperception among Georgians that one sen-
tenced to life imprisonment was eligible for parole in only seven years, which substan-
tially underestimated actual eligibility requirements. See Paduano & Smith, Deathly
Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18
Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 211, 220-25 (1987).
224. See, eg., A. Dershowitz, The Last Resort, in A Punishment in Search of a Crime
329, 331 (1989)("Legal rules do not determine who gets executed. What determines who
gets executed is the race of the victim-that's the single most important factor-the qual-
ity of the lawyer and the wealth of the client .... There is another thing we haven't
looked at systematically, yet, but that I am convinced has an effect. That is, the locale.
That is, whether the defendant and victim comes from the town in which the trial is
occurring.").
225. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury... nor shall any person
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that the same view was held by its promulgators. 226 This suggests that
for the abolitionist argument to prevail, the death penalty must have be-
come unacceptable under some consensus of enlightened opinion about
the deserts of criminal offenders.7" Of course, the notion that the eighth
amendment should follow evolving notions of desert is not novel. That
very principle provided the ultimate basis for outlawing capital punish-
ment for offenses like rape in Coker,"8 and, offered the only coherent
explanation for individualized capital sentencing mandated in Woodson
and Lockett." 9 It is consistent with this underlying principle to conclude
that the eighth amendment also should proscribe the use of the death
penalty altogether if we cannot measure the deserts of capital offenders
with sufficient accuracy. Nonetheless, the argument for per se abolition,
derived from societal standards of decency, collides with the strong pub-
lie support for the death penalty as a permissible sanction for murder."
Of course, the evidence of public support for the death penalty itself
might be challenged as reflecting uninformed or illegitimate views. In-
deed, Professor Amsterdam argued in Furman that it was only because
the death penalty was not evenhandedly applied that its use did not "pro-
voke public revulsion." 231 Yet Justices White and Stewart, who wrote
the two opinions rejecting the abolitionist course in 1976, explicitly relied
upon that evidence to bolster their decisions.2 32 Thus, in interpreting the
eighth amendment the Court has been unwilling to reject as invalid the
evidence of popular support for the death sentence as a penalty for
murder.2 33
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;.., nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
U.S. Const. amend. V.
226. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § I ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law").
227. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) ("The
amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.").
228. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 151-62 and accompanying text.
230. Such evidence exists in the legislative reaction to Furman, see, e.g., Note, supra
note 21, at 1699-1700 (detailing the 28 states that enacted new death-penalty statutes in
the first two years after Furman), public opinion polls, see, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 5, at
1136 n.5 ("polls indicate that popular support for the death penalty is overwhelming"),
and the willingness of capital sentencers to impose death sentences; see Note, supra note
30, at 407-08 (noting that as of November, 1990, 142 persons had been executed since
Furman and at least 2393 others were under sentence of death).
231. M. Meltsner, Cruel and Unusual; The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment
269 (1973).
232. See F. Zimring & G. Hawkins, Capital Punishment and the American Agenda
65-66 (1986).
233. The Court also could reject the notion that its obligation in applying the eighth
amendment is merely to enforce the prevailing consensus of decency rather than to lead
the way in enforcing "broad claims of general humanity." Id. at 61 (quoting Burke,
Speech to the British Electors: A Defense of his Conduct in Parliament, in Orations and
Arguments by English and American Statesman 121 (B. Bradley ed. 1894)). The propri-
ety of that approach is debatable, however, and, in any event, it is uncertain that a major-
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Of course, this leaves open the question of how to explain our inability
to enforce an eighth amendment command in all cases. Because accu-
racy or even great consistency is infeasible, some will be sentenced to die
who do not deserve it in an absolute sense or even according to the views
of most societal members. The answer must rest on an assumption that
sufficient consensus exists about the meaning of terms like "culpability"
and "moral merit" that generally will be reflected in capital-sentencing
decisions. It is appropriate to question the propriety of this response
given that it admits the inevitability of some erroneous decisions to im-
pose the death penalty. Sentencers cannot measure offender "culpabil-
ity" or "moral merit" with great accuracy or consistency. Still, some
would contend that our inability to measure deserts accurately not only
fails to call for abolition,"' but instead calls for reconsidering whether
the eighth amendment really incorporates a proportionality principle. 235
Assuming the viability of the proportionality doctrine in the capital
context, however, rejecting the argument for per se invalidation of capital
punishment at least calls for serious efforts to vindicate the core eighth
amendment objective of ensuring that only those who deserve the death
penalty receive it. Our human inability to fathom "correct" answers to
some of the subsidiary questions involved in desert assessments is irreme-
diable and leaves room for the arbitrary influence of variable sentencer
opinions. Yet some of the other problems are not beyond repair. For
example, two protections urged by Professor Gillers are helpful in pro-
moting "accurate" judgments of offender deserts.236 First, the sentencing
body should be a jury, rather than a judge.23 7 A jury, more than a judge,
is likely to include members whose views on the death penalty approxi-
ity of the current Justices would disfavor capital punishment even were they to assume
the roles of Burkean legislators.
234. Cf. Van Den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1662,
1665 (1986)(footnote omitted):
Despite precautions, nearly all human activities, such as trucking, lighting, or
construction, cost the lives of some innocent bystanders. We do not give up
these activities, because the advantages, moral or material, outweigh the unin-
tended losses. Analogously, for those who think the death penalty just, miscar-
riages of justice are offset by the moral benefits and the usefulness of doing
justice. For those who think the death penalty unjust even when it does not
miscarry, miscarriages hardly can be decisive.
235. Cf. R. Berger, Death Penalties 40-41, 73 (1982)(arguing that a protection against
disproportional punishments has no proper place in eighth amendment interpretation).
236. See Gillers, supra note 199, at II11. Professor Gillers argues, as I have, that the
capital sentencer should focus on offender deserts. However, he describes the sentencer's
choice as one between "[m]ercy, and its converse, retribution", and, thus, appears not to
view "mercy" as a concept outside the realm of rational justice, as I have. Id. In addi-
tion, Professor Gillers offers reasons different than mine to support his conclusion that
offender deserts must be the focus of the capital-sentencing decision. He argues for a
desert focus because the sentencer cannot produce accurate predictions about an of-
fender's future dangerousness. See id. at 1095-1107. I agree with his conclusion, though
I do not think it clarifies the affirmative argument for why a desert assessment should be a
prerequisite to a death sentence.
237. See id. at 1084-95.
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mate the societal consensus.2"' If required to act by at least a substantial
majority, a jury will more likely vindicate community views on the limits
of appropriate retribution. Secondly, the sentencer should not be in-
formed of any downward revisionary authority on the part of the execu-
tive branch regarding a life prison sentence.2a 9 For reasons already
mentioned, I would go further by requiring that jurors be told that no
provision exists for parole or commutation of a life prison term.2'" The
Court already has declined to pursue these sorts of protections; it has
allowed capital sentencing by a single judge who may have extreme views
favoring the capital sanction24 and has authorized states to tell capital
sentencers of the executive's downward revisionary authority over life
sentences. 242 Were the Court to pursue the notion that desert judgments
should govern the capital sentencer's decision, however, it should also
recognize the problems with these holdings.
The Court also should articulate the limits on attorney argument in
capital-sentencing trials. Professor White has already described the ten-
dency of prosecutors to extend well beyond arguments based on retribu-
tion in urging capital sentencers to impose death.24 3 He has also noted
the absence of consistent guidance from the courts about the proper
boundaries on prosecutorial summation in death-penalty trials.2 This
problem must be addressed if desert judgments are to be the central focus
of capital-sentencing decisions. The boundaries of appropriate summa-
tion must depend in part on what questions, other than the mandated
desert inquiries, a state might choose to employ as a basis for allowing
the capital sentencer to reprieve offenders from the death penalty. How-
ever, the Supreme Court can at least start with the proposition that
where a state limits the sentencer's discretion to reprieve offenders based
on the mandated desert inquiries, prosecutors cannot urge jurors to vote
238. See id; cf. White, Fact-Finding and the Death Penalty: The Scope of the Capital
Defendant's Right to Jury Trial, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 21-27 (1989)(arguing that the
sixth amendment requires a jury to make certain of the findings underlying the capital
sentencing decision).
239. See Gillers, supra note 199, at 1107-10.
240. If it is deemed unacceptable not to tell sentencers the truth about the existence of
parole eligibility of inmates after a certain term of years, the Court must resolve whether
states can fail to offer the capital sentencer the option of imposing a life-imprisonment
term without possibility of parole and, if so, what is the minimum acceptable term before
the prisoner will become parole eligible. States cannot offer the sentencer an option to
the death penalty that involves such a small term of required incarceration that death is
chosen by default. See generally Gillers, supra note 199, at 1109-10 (a state that offers
inadequate alternatives to a death sentence limits the jury to "an artificial choice").
241. For decisions affirming capital sentencing by judge rather than by jury, see Wal-
ton v. Arizona, - U.S. _, 110 S. CL 3047 (1990); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638(1989); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
242. See, eg.,California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983)(capital sentencing jury prop-
erly instructed about governor's power to commute a life sentence).
243. See White, supra note 6, at 112-30.
244. See id. at 113.
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for death based on general deterrence, incapacitation, or other unrelated
arguments.
The Court also could help to remedy the influence of particularly odi-
ous factors on capital sentencers' evaluations of offender deserts. As with
other decisions to reprieve capital offenders, the Court could require that
capital sentencers certify that they have not considered factors like the
race, ethnic background, sexual preference, or place of residence of the
offender or of the victim. 245 This protection would do more than the
Court has previously accomplished to encourage capital sentencers to
confront their biases and to strive to overcome them. This course also
would underscore the Court's concern with ensuring eighth amendment
justice.246
CONCLUSION
Equal Justice and the Death Penalty provides valuable information
about the functioning of Georgia's archetypal capital-sentencing system.
The statistical studies it describes indicate that death penalty decisions in
Georgia frequently rest on concededly inappropriate factors -particu-
245. The death penalty provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 incorporate
this mandate. Title VII of the Act permits the death penalty to be imposed for some
drug-related killings. One of the provisions regulating the sentencing hearing reads:
In any hearing held before a jury under this section, the court shall instruct the
jury that in its consideration of whether the sentence of death is justified it shall
not consider the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the de-
fendant or the victim, and that the jury is not to recommend a sentence of death
unless it has concluded that it would recommend a sentence of death for the
crime in question no matter what the race, color, religious beliefs, national ori-
gin, or sex of the defendant, or the victim, may be. The jury shall return to the
court a certificate signed by each juror that consideration of the race, color,
religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant, or the victim was not
involved in reaching his or her individual decision, and that the individual juror
would have made the same recommendation regarding a sentence for the crime
in question no matter what the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or
sex of the defendant, or the victim, may be.
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 21 U.S.C. § 848(o)(1) (Supp. 1990).
246. The Court also should clarify the sphere of evidence that is necessarily relevant at
the sentencing hearing after resolving the nature of the mandated desert questions to be
put to the sentencer. I have argued that the sentencer should resolve both the offender's
culpability for the capital offense and his general moral worth. See supra notes 201-03
and accompanying text. If the Court were to conclude that the only mandatory question
should focus on the offender's culpability for the capital offense, it should narrow the
current Lockett test of relevancy, which declares any evidence about the offender's char-
acter, record, or crime, relevant to the sentencing inquiry regardless of whether it relates
to culpability. Further, if the Court were to choose a dual approach, it should mandate a
balancing of the probative effects of evidence bearing on the general moral worth question
against its prejudicial effects. For example, evidence that the offender did not attend
church regularly is more prejudicial than probative in resolving the offender's deserts.
Whatever approach is chosen, it is unclear whether the admissible evidence should be
limited to evidence about the offender or his crime. Evidence about the nature of life in
prison or execution procedures, for example, would appear to bear on the retributive




larly on the race of the victim. Of course, the Supreme Court declined in
the McCleskey case to reject the Georgia system based on this evidence.
Nonetheless, these studies may have positively influenced the Court's de-
cisions in other cases. It was nearly a year after the Court received Mc-
Cleskey's certiorari petition247 that it decided Turner v. Murray248 and
Batson v. Kentucky.249 Both cases overruled longstanding precedent to
protect against racial bias among jurors in criminal cases. In Turner, the
Court held that a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is
entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and
questioned on the issue of racial bias. In Batson, the Court restricted the
ability of prosecutors in cases involving minority defendants to use per-
emptory strikes to eliminate potential jurors of the defendant's race. The
Court made no reference in its opinions in either of those decisions to the
Baldus studies. However, no other reason is apparent for the Court's
rather sudden decision to alter existing principles governing jury voir
dire and selection. The evidence from the Baldus studies may have influ-
enced some of the Justices.
Despite the possible influence of the Baldus studies on the outcomes in
Turner and Batson, the authors of Equal Justice and the Death Penalty
contend that the Court failed to heed their evidence on the claim to
which it was most relevant. In the McCleskey decision, the Court indeed
demonstrated its ultimate unwillingness to demand statistical equality in
the distribution of death penalties. The statistical evidence presented,
which the Court purported to assume was valid, revealed that a defend-
ant whose victim was white was 4.3 times more likely to receive the death
penalty than a similarly situated defendant whose victim was black.
That degree of disparity based on an illegitimate factor is unfathomable if
one of the goals for regulating capital sentencing truly is consistency2-  in
the distribution of death sentences.
Though I disagree with the Court's relative indifference after Furman
to the potential for improper discrimination in the distribution of death
sentences (and believe abolition was the only truly effective remedy), I
also disagree in two general respects with the authors' legal analysis of
the McCleskey problem. First, I do not think it at all clear that, having
forsaken the abolitionist course, the Court should decide the validity of
capital punishment systems based on their propensity to produce statisti-
cal consistency in the sentencing of those who deserve death sentences.
247. MeCleskey's lawyers filed the petition for certiorari in May, 1985. See S. Gross &
R Mauro, supra note 9, at 159. However, the Court did not finally grant certiorari in the
case until July 7, 1986. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 478 U.S. 1019 (1986). "It is extremely
unusual for the Court to withhold action for so long and then to grant a hearing in a
major precedential case." S. Gross & R. Mauro, supra note 9, at 159 (emphasis in origi-
nal). Thus, by the time the writ of certiorari issued, "it was already apparent that the
case was uncommonly troublesome." Id.
248. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
249. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
250. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 223 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
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A variety of intractable problems surround the view that the constitution
demands statistical consistency in the distribution of death sentences. I
believe that courts can only feasibly promote consistency in this area by
mandating specific procedural protections that states can adopt and rely
on. The flaw in the McCleskey Court's actions therefore center not as
much on its unwillingness to adjudicate based directly on statistical evi-
dence as on its earlier failure to implement any meaningful protections
against improper discrimination in the capital-selection process.
My second objection to the authors' analysis focuses on their view that
the eighth amendment mandates equality. There are two normative
objectives for regulating capital sentencing procedure. One is to promote
evenhandedness in the distribution of death sentences among those who
deserve death. That is a fourteenth amendment concern. The other ob-
jective, at least as important, is to ensure that only those capital offenders
who actually deserve the death penalty receive it. That is the eighth
amendment objective. The authors' assumption that consistency is the
objective under both the eighth and the fourteenth amendments stems
from their failure to acknowledge that not all capital offenders deserve
the death penalty and, thus, that equality is not the only explanation for
the decision in Furman. Protecting against discrimination on odious
grounds among those who deserve the death penalty is essential. Yet, by
suggesting that inconsistency is the central problem with current capital
sentencing jurisprudence, the authors obscure the true flaw in the Court's
effort at eighth amendment regulation: its failure to ensure that the death
penalty is imposed only on the deserving.
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